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1. Introduction
Home bias is a perennial feature of inter-
national capital markets. Nineteenth century 
economists called it the “disinclination of 
capital to migrate.”1 Standard finance theory 
predicts that investors hold a diversified port-
folio of equities across the world if capital is 
1 Reported in Flandreau (2006).
fully mobile across borders. Because foreign 
equities provide great diversification oppor-
tunities, a point made early on in Grubel 
(1968), Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Solnik 
(1974), falling barriers to international trade 
in financial assets over the last thirty-years 
should have led investors across the world to 
rebalance their portfolio away from national 
assets toward foreign assets. The process of 
“financial globalization” fostered by capital 
account liberalizations, electronic trading, 
increasing exchanges of information across 
borders, and falling transaction costs has cer-
tainly led to a large increase in cross-border 
asset trade (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2003). 
However, investors seem still reluctant to 
reap the full benefits of international diver-
sification and hold a disproportionate share 
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of local equities, a phenomenon referred 
to as the “home bias in equities.” Since the 
seminal paper of French and Poterba (1991), 
the home bias in equities has continuously 
intrigued and fascinated financial economists 
and international macroeconomists. Despite 
better financial integration, the home bias 
has not decreased sizably: in 2007, U.S. 
investors still hold more than 80 percent of 
domestic equities, a much higher proportion 
than the share of U.S. equities in the world 
market portfolio. Indeed, home bias in equi-
ties is still observed in most countries and 
tends to be higher in emerging markets.
Many explanations have been put forward 
in the literature to explain this very robust 
portfolio fact. We do not intend to provide a 
definite answer nor choose among alternative 
explanations, as they probably all contribute 
to part of the gap. Our goal is to review where 
theory has led us, provide relevant empiri-
cal facts and take a stand at what might be 
the next challenges ahead. We distinguish 
between three broad classes of explanations: 
(i) hedging motives in frictionless financial 
markets (real exchange rate and non-tradable 
income risk), (ii) asset trade costs in interna-
tional financial markets (such as transaction 
costs, differences in tax treatments between 
national and foreign assets or differences in 
legal frameworks), and (iii) informational fric-
tions and behavioral biases. We will review 
these explanations, highlighting important 
recent developments in macroeconomic 
modeling of the open economy, referred to as 
Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics. 
We will also discuss asymmetric information 
models, including the recent literature with 
endogenous information acquisition.
We put some emphasis on recent devel-
opments in the macroeconomics literature, 
which has embedded nontrivial portfolio 
choices in standard two country general 
equilibrium macro models. Explaining 
equity home bias has been one of the main 
 motivations for this literature, which has 
first focused on models with equities only. 
But the importance of considering portfo-
lio choices across a broader class of assets 
(bonds, corporate debt, equity . . . ) is now 
widely recognized. We develop a standard 
two country/two good Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with 
endogenous portfolio choice and allow for 
equity trade in first instance, as in the early 
literature, and then generalize the set up to 
accommodate trade in bonds and equity. 
This allows us both to present recent meth-
odological developments to fully characterize 
portfolios in this class of models and to show 
the limitations of the early literature. These 
new models also call for new portfolio facts. 
Accordingly, we present some new evidence 
on international holdings across different 
types of assets: equities, bonds, and banking 
assets. We focus on portfolio investment and 
abstract from Foreign Direct Investment, as 
its determinants may be of a different nature 
and are studied extensively in the trade lit-
erature. Finally, we present some new micro 
data on institutional holdings of equity at the 
fund level. These data should inform mac-
roeconomic modeling of the open economy 
as well as models of delegated investment, 
which belong to a fast-growing literature: 
a large share of international investment is 
intermediated.
In section 2, we present the standard defi-
nition of home equity bias and some recent 
measures across countries and across time. 
In section 3, we focus on the recent meth-
odological developments in the macroeco-
nomics literature. In section 4, we focus on 
the role of hedging motives as a source of 
equity home bias. We use standard dynamic 
models of the Open Economy Financial 
Macroeconomics literature. In section 5, 
we present the literature on trade costs in 
financial markets (transaction costs, interna-
tional taxation, legal frameworks). In section 
6, we review the finance literature on infor-
mation asymmetries and behavioral biases. 
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In section 7, in line with recent theoretical 
work, we present some new evidence on 
aggregate portfolio holdings across a wider 
range of assets. We also present new port-
folio facts at the fund level and discuss leads 
for future research. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Equity Home Bias:  
Definition and Measure
2.1 Definition
French and Poterba (1991) were the 
first to our knowledge to document domes-
tic ownership shares across countries. Using 
data for the United States, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany, they show 
that investors hold a disproportionate share 
of domestic assets in their equity portfolios. 
In 1989, 92 percent of the U.S. stock market 
was held by U.S. residents. Analogous num-
bers for Japan, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany are respectively 96 percent, 92 
percent, 89 percent, and 79 percent. They 
label this lack of cross border diversification 
the equity home bias.2 This is a well-known 
puzzle in international finance: in a world 
with frictionless financial markets, the most 
basic International Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) model with homogenous 
investors across the world would predict that 
the representative investor of a given country 
should hold the world market portfolio. In 
other words, the share of his financial wealth 
invested in local equities should be equal to 
the share of local equities in the world mar-
ket portfolio, a prediction that contradicts the 
most casual observation of the data on portfo-
lio holdings. As a result, the measure of equity 
home bias (EHB) that is most commonly used 
is the difference between actual holdings of 
2 Bohn and Tesar (1996) estimate the share of foreign 
equities in the U.S. portfolio to be still very low in 1995, 
equal to 8 percent. Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004) 
estimate it to be slightly above 10 percent in 2000. 
domestic equity and the share of domestic 
equity in the world market portfolio:3
(1) EH B i = 1 −
 Share of Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings    ______________________________
Share of Foreign Equities in the World Market Portfolio
 .
When the home bias measure for country 
i EH B i is equal to one, there is full equity 
home bias; when it is equal to zero, the port-
folio is optimally diversified according to the 
basic International CAPM.
2.2 Evidence across Time and across 
Countries
While one could argue that, at the end 
of the 1980s, international capital markets 
were far from being frictionless and this 
could contribute to rationalize home bias, 
this line of explanation seems more doubt-
ful today. Despite increased financial inte-
gration, the equity home bias remains a 
pervasive phenomenon across countries and 
across time (classic surveys include Lewis 
1999 and Karolyi and Stulz 2003). See also 
Sercu and Vanpée (2008) for recent evi-
dence). In  figure 1, we show the evolution of 
home bias measures in developed countries 
across regions of the world: it has decreased 
over the last twenty years with the process of 
“financial globalization” but remains high in 
most countries (see also table 1 for a recent 
snapshot of home bias measures for selected 
3 See, for instance, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock 
(2004). Another commonly used measure in finance is a 
deviation from a benchmark mean–variance portfolio. 
Benchmark portfolio weights are calculated from a mean 
variance optimization problem with sample estimates of 
the means and variance–covariance matrix of returns. The 
main issue in the existing literature adopting the finance 
approach are how to measure returns and covariance 
matrices. Papers differ in the extent to which they use real 
or nominal returns, how they estimate expected returns, 
and how they deal with structural breaks and nonstationar-
ity. As a result, there is a degree of heterogeneity in the 
estimates of expected returns and second moments.
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countries). On average, the degree of home 
bias across the world is 0.63 (lower in Europe 
where monetary union after 1999 seem 
to have had an effect).4 For the developed 
world, this means that the share of foreign 
equities in investors’ portfolios is roughly a 
third of what it should be if the benchmark 
is the basic International CAPM. In figure 2, 
we construct a similar indicator for emerg-
ing markets. Emerging markets have less 
4 See Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) and Fidora, 
Fratzscher, and Thimann (2007) for studies on the impact 
of the Monetary Union on cross-border equity diversifi-
cation. Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010) 
show that the euro’s impact on financial integration was 
primarily driven by eliminating the currency risk.
diversified equity portfolios than developed 
 countries and do not exhibit any clear 
downward trend in home bias. The average 
degree of home bias in these countries is 
0.9 (smaller in emerging Asia and larger in 
Latin America) and investors in these coun-
tries hold one-tenth of the amount of foreign 
equities they should be holding according to 
the basic International CAPM model.
This robust stylized fact has received con-
siderable attention from both the finance 
literature and the macroeconomics litera-
ture. The main difference between these 
two sets of literature relies on some model-
ing assumptions. To simplify, the traditional 
finance literature has tried to rationalize the 
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Figure 1. Home Bias in Equities Measures across Developed Countries
Note: The country measure EHBi is market capitalization-weighted for each region. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. International Financial Statistics and World Federation of Exchanges Database. 
Countries: Australia and Japan; Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom); North America (Canada and United States).
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equity home bias in multicountry models of 
portfolio choice where asset prices and their 
second moments are given (in particular in 
these models the risk-free interest rate is 
exogenously given). The macro literature 
has tried to integrate international portfo-
lio decisions in otherwise standard DSGE 
models of the international economy. These 
models have a fully general equilibrium 
structure and asset prices and their second 
moments are endogenously determined.5 
The motivation is however the same: foreign 
equities seem to offer diversification benefits 
that are not reaped by investors and both 
5 The dichotomy, which historically seems relevant, 
appears increasingly artificial as more papers bridge the 
two strands of literature.
financial economists and macroeconomists 
are intrigued by this fact.6
3. Open Economy Financial 
Macroeconomics
The theoretical macroeconomic literature 
points toward potential gains from inter-
national diversification to hedge national 
production risk. In the presence of imper-
fectly correlated productivity shocks or out-
put shocks across countries, owning foreign 
6 The finance literature tends to focus on the diversifica-
tion gains looking at asset price data and to evaluate how 
an increase in the share of foreign equities would improve 
the portfolio performance based on some criteria. The 
macro-finance literature tends to use consumption data 
to measure the potential welfare gains from international 
risk-sharing. See section 6 for a discussion.
TablE 1 
Home bias in Equities in 2008 for Selected Countries
Domestic market in %
of world market capitalization
Share of portfolio in
domestic equity in %
Degree of equity home bias
= EHBi
Source country (1) (2) (3)
australia 1.8 76.1 0.76
brazil 1.6 98.6 0.99
China 7.8 99.2 0.99
Canada 2.7 80.2 0.80
Euro area 13.5 56.7 0.50
Japan 8.9 73.5 0.71
South africa 1.4 87.8 0.88
South Korea 1.4 88.5 0.88
Sweden 0.7 43.6 0.43
Switzerland 2.3 50.9 0.50
United Kingdom 5.1 54.5 0.52
United States 32.6 77.2 0.66
Note: For Euro area countries, within Euro area cross-border equity holdings are considered as Foreign Equity 
Holdings. 
Sources: authors’ calculations. International Financial Statistics, Consumer Portfolio Investment Survey and World 
Federation of Exchange.
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equity could help to smooth consumption. 
This is most obvious in the context of a 
two country model with one single trad-
able good, as, e.g., in Lucas (1982): in such 
a world, domestic and foreign investors hold 
an identical portfolio of claims to output 
(equities), the market portfolio, thus diver-
sifying optimally national output risks. As in 
the textbook finance portfolio theory, in such 
a world the home bias in equities is seen as a 
failure of the standard diversification motive. 
However, one should be cautious: inves-
tors across the world would hold the same 
portfolio, only if they were homogeneous. In 
reality, heterogeneity across investors from 
different countries leads to departure from 
the world market portfolio and potentially a 
bias toward national assets. Various sources 
of heterogeneity leading to equity home bias 
have been explored in the macro literature. 
They fall in two broad classes of explana-
tions: (i) hedging motives (real exchange 
rate risk and nontradable income risk) and 
(ii) asset trade costs in international financial 
markets (such as transaction costs, differ-
ences in tax treatments, in legal framework 
and other policy induced barriers to foreign 
investment).
We will review in details these two expla-
nations in sections 4 and 5. We now present 
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Figure 2. Home Bias in Equities Measures across Emerging Countries
Note: The country measure EHBi is market capitalization-weighted for each region. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. International Financial Statistics and World Federation of Exchanges Database. 
Countries: Central and South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru); 
South Africa; Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Ukraine); Emerging Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Israel, Bangladesh, India).
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how recent methodological developments in 
Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics 
allow us to solve for (nontrivial) portfolio 
decisions in DSGE models.
3.1 Methodological Breakthrough
Until recently, most macroeconomic mod-
els of the international economy relied mostly 
on the following asset structures: either one 
noncontingent bond traded internationally 
or complete asset markets through Arrow–
Debreu securities. None of these models 
could say anything about gross foreign asset 
holdings and the extent to which tradable 
assets could be used to share risks interna-
tionally. Recent methodological advances 
have allowed a much richer structure of asset 
trade to be examined.
Building on perturbation methods (see 
Judd 1998), Devereux and Sutherland 
(2011) develop a solution method that 
allows standard linear solution techniques 
for macroeconomic models to be adapted 
to solve for models with portfolio choice. 
Standard linear solution techniques can-
not directly be applied since these methods 
rely on a first-order approximation around 
a deterministic steady state: to a first order 
approximation, assets are perfect substi-
tutes, as they deliver the same expected 
return, so portfolio choice is not pinned 
down. Devereux and Sutherland’s work 
relies on several insights. Firstly, building 
on earlier work by Judd and Guu (2001) and 
Samuelson (1970), they show that the steady 
state portfolio can be derived as the portfo-
lio in a noisy environment and letting the 
noise go to zero. Secondly, they show that 
in order for the steady state portfolio to be 
well defined, a second-order approximation 
of the portfolio equations (Euler equations) 
needs to be considered, while only the first-
order dynamics of the other equations of the 
model are required to pin down steady state 
portfolios (also called zero order portfolio). 
Finally, the authors show that the first-order 
dynamics of the model only depends on 
the steady-state portfolio. In addition to 
these conceptual insights, Devereux and 
Sutherland (2011) also provide a formula 
that can be used to compute portfolios 
analytically in a fairly general class of mod-
els. In a companion paper, Devereux and 
Sutherland (2010), the authors show that in 
order to solve for the first order dynamics of 
the portfolio, a second-order approximation 
of the nonportfolio equations of the model 
is needed, while the portfolio equations 
need to be approximated to the third order. 
Portfolio changes (around the steady-state 
portfolios) are driven by changes in second 
moments (third-order terms), which deter-
mine changes in expected returns across 
assets. It is then also true that the second-
order dynamics of the model depends on 
the first-order dynamics of portfolios. The 
authors show that approximate portfolios 
can be computed analytically in many cases.
In simultaneous work, Tille and van 
Wincoop (2010) develop a solution tech-
nique that is analogous to the one presented 
in Devereux and Sutherland (2011). The 
main difference is that Tille and van Wincoop 
(2010) rely on numerical iterations to solve 
for portfolios. This requires more computa-
tional effort, but also implies that their solu-
tion method can be applied to a wider class 
of models. To compute steady-state portfo-
lios, they linearize nonportfolio equations up 
to the first-order for a given portfolio. They 
then solve for the endogenous portfolio as 
a fixed-point in a second-order approxima-
tion of the portfolio (Euler) equations. As 
in Devereux and Sutherland (2010), they 
show how going one order further in the 
approximation allows to investigate portfolio 
dynamics. They apply their method to a two 
country/two good model with one stock in 
each country and show how portfolio dynam-
ics relates to the time variation of expected 
returns and second moments. In particu-
lar, they investigate the predicted capital 
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outflows and inflows, relate them to portfolio 
growth and portfolio reallocation,7 and assess 
the performance of the model looking at bal-
ance of payments statistics on capital flows. 
Other recent work that tackles the challenge 
of solving for portfolio choice are Evans 
and Hnatkovska (2006 and 2008) and Judd, 
Kubler, and Schmedders (2002). The meth-
ods developed in Evans and Hnatkovska 
(2008) and Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders 
(2002) can be applied to very general classes 
of models, but are quite complex and present 
significant departures from standard DSGE 
solution methods.
3.2 Shortcomings and Extensions
The main advantage of the perturba-
tion methods developed by Devereux 
and Sutherland (2011) and Tille and van 
Wincoop (2010) are: (1) they are very easy 
to implement as they are close to standard 
approximation methods used in DSGE mod-
els; (2) they can be applied to a broad range 
of environments (complete and incomplete 
markets models, a potentially large number 
of shocks and/or securities); and (3) they pro-
vide (approximate) closed-form expressions 
for portfolios in many cases. These methods 
face however some limitations as they rely 
on local approximations around the deter-
ministic steady state: as any local methods, 
they are valid around the point of approxi-
mation, which is problematic when there are 
large deviations away from this point. This 
can arise for instance in presence of large 
shocks (such as disaster risks, see, e.g., in 
Barro 2006) or when the problem is nonsta-
tionary. For example, in incomplete markets 
models, the distribution of wealth across 
countries may have a unit-root and there-
fore the solution may wander away from 
the approximation point. Since the methods 
are mainly based on first- and second-order 
7 See also Kraay and Ventura (2000, 2003) for a similar 
terminology.
approximations, they may also be inaccurate 
in models that exhibit strong nonlinearities, 
such as models with borrowing constraints. 
Lastly, the approximation of the decision 
rules in these methods is made around the 
deterministic steady state. However, the 
deterministic steady state might not be the 
stationary steady state of the model in pres-
ence of risk. Coeurdacier, Rey, and Winant 
(2011) use perturbation methods around 
the “risky steady state,” defined as the point 
where agents choose to stay at a given date if 
the realization of shocks is 0 at this date but 
if they expect future risk.8 The welfare impli-
cations for risk-sharing can be quite differ-
ent from the standard ones around the risky 
steady state since uncertainty directly affects 
steady-state variables. While still local, such 
a method should be more accurate when 
decision rules in presence of risk are signifi-
cantly different from the ones obtained when 
risk goes toward zero (as in Devereux and 
Sutherland 2011). The question of accuracy 
of these solution methods is not easily tack-
led however as for most models for which 
they are implemented, one cannot provide 
exact numerical methods. Exceptions of 
two-country/two goods models where solu-
tions can be found without approximations 
are models with log-linear preferences as in 
Pavlova and Rigobon (2007, 2009, 2010).9
Ultimately, one should expect the devel-
opment of global methods to emerge in 
order to solve portfolio choice models with 
multiple agents, multiple goods and mul-
tiple securities. Developing global methods 
would be useful as they would potentially be 
8 For early work on the risky steady state, see Julliard 
and Kamenik (2005). For another application of the risky 
steady state concept in a different context, see Gertler, 
Kiyotaki, and Queralto (forthcoming).
9 See also Devereux and Saito (2006). As Pavlova and 
Rigobon (2007, 2009, 2010), Devereux and Saito (2006) 
use a continuous time framework that allows some analyti-
cal solutions to be derived, but it can only be applied to a 
restricted class of models.
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adequate in environments where standard 
perturbation methods fail and they could also 
provide insights on the accuracy of perturba-
tion methods. Recent work in that direction 
includes Dumas and Lyasoff (2011) in finite-
horizons models and Chien, Cole, and Lustig 
(2011) in a one-good closed economy model 
with multiple agents. Extending these meth-
ods to standard international macro models 
is a next important step.
Despite their limitations, perturbation 
methods constitute a major improvement 
that makes it possible to incorporate non-
trivial portfolio choice in models of the 
open macroeconomy. These methodologi-
cal improvements have given a new life to 
the literature investigating the origins of 
portfolio biases. A first generation of mod-
els of Open Financial Macroeconomics has 
looked at the hedging of real exchange rate 
risk and nontradable income risk as a source 
of portfolio biases in models with equities 
only. A second generation of models has 
emphasized the importance of describing 
portfolios with a richer menu of assets and 
has developed models with multiple asset 
classes (bonds and equities). We review 
these two strands of literature sequentially 
in the next section.
4. Hedging Motives in Open Economy 
Financial Macroeconomics
Hedging motives lead to departure from 
the benchmark model of Lucas (1982) 
where homogeneous investors across the 
world hold identical portfolios. By hedging, 
we mean choosing financial claims that help 
insulate investors from sources of risk affect-
ing their income streams. The sources of risk 
developed in the literature are the following:
•  Real exchange rate risk: the prices of 
investors’ consumption goods fluctuate 
and this affects the purchasing power of 
their income.
•  Nontradable income risk: investors 
receive a part of their income (wages 
in particular) that cannot be traded in 
financial markets.10
In other words, because investors in dif-
ferent countries have different exposure to 
real exchange rate risk and/or to nontradable 
income risk, they will hold different equity 
portfolios in equilibrium. It is important to 
understand that in these cases, equity port-
folio “biases” are neither inefficient nor the 
consequence of some frictions in financial 
markets. The hedging of domestic sources 
of risks leads to different optimal portfolios 
across borders but perfect (or almost per-
fect) risk-sharing is preserved.
In order to analyze how these hedging 
motives affect equity portfolios, we present 
a benchmark two-country/two-good model 
where the only traded assets are equities 
of both countries. We show how log-linear-
ization techniques can be used to derive 
(zero-order) steady-state portfolios. We also 
revisit some of the results of the literature 
regarding the hedging of real exchange rate 
risk and nontradable income risk in an equity 
only model. In particular, we show the dif-
ficulties to rationalize the equity home bias 
in such a framework. In section 4.2, we will 
show how a multiple asset class model pro-
vides an answer to most of these difficulties.
4.1 Hedging Motives in a Benchmark Model 
with Equities Only 
4.1.1 Set-up and First-Order Conditions
There are two symmetric countries, Home 
(H) and Foreign (F), each with a representa-
tive household. Country i = H, F produces 
one good using labor and capital. We assume 
that capital is fixed for now and will allow for 
10 The presence of government spending shocks can 
also generate a source of nontradable income risk due to 
tax changes.
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endogenous capital accumulation in the sub-
sequent section 4.2. All markets are perfectly 
competitive.
Preferences
Country i is inhabited by a representative 
household that has the following lifetime 
utility function: 
(2)  E 0  ∑ 
t=0
 
∞
  β  t (  C i, t 1−σ  _1 − σ  −   l i, t 1+ω  _ 1 + ω ) , 
where ω is the Frish-elasticity of labor sup-
ply  ( ω > 0 ) and σ the relative risk aversion 
parameter  ( σ > 0 ) .  C i, t is i’s aggregate con-
sumption in period t and  l i, t is labor effort. 
C i, t is a composite good given by:
(3)  C i, t =  [  a 1/ϕ ( c i, t i )  ( ϕ−1 ) /ϕ 
 + (1 − a ) 1/ϕ ( c j, t i ) (ϕ−1)/ϕ ] ϕ/(ϕ−1) ,
 with j ≠ i,
where  c j, t i is country i’s consumption of the 
good produced by country j at date t. ϕ > 0 
is the elasticity of substitution between the 
two goods. In the (symmetric) determinis-
tic steady state, a is the share of consump-
tion spending devoted to the local good. 
We assume a preference bias for local 
goods11,  1 _2 < a < 1.
The welfare based consumer price index 
that corresponds to these preferences is: 
(4)  P i, t =  [ a ( p i, t ) 1−ϕ + (1 − a) ( p j, t ) 1−ϕ ] 1/(1−ϕ) ,
 j ≠ i, 
where  p i, t is the price of good i.
11 This “consumption home bias” is assumed exog-
enously. It has been extensively studied in the trade litera-
ture since the classic paper of McCallum (1995).
Technologies and Firms’ Decisions
In period t, country produces  y i, t units of 
good i according to the production function 
(5)  y i, t =  θ i, t ( k 0 ) α ( l i, t ) 1−α , 
with 0 < α < 1.  k 0 is the country’s initial 
stock of capital. It is fixed. Total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP)  θ i, t > 0  is an exogenous ran-
dom variable.
There is a (representative) firm in country 
i that hires local labor and produces output, 
using technology (5). Due to the Cobb–
Douglas technology, a share 1 − α of output 
at market prices is paid to workers. Thus, the 
country i wage incomes are: 
(6)  w i, t  l i, t = (1 − α) p i, t  y i, t ,
where  w i, t is the country i wage rate.
A share α of country i output at market 
prices is paid as a dividend  d i, t to shareholders: 
(7)  d i, t = α  p i, t  y i, t .
Financial Markets and Instantaneous 
Budget Constraint
Financial markets are frictionless. There is 
international trade in stocks. The country i 
representative firm issues a stock that repre-
sents a claim to its stream of dividends { d i, t }. 
The supply of shares is normalized at unity. 
Each household fully owns the local stock, at 
birth, and has zero initial foreign assets. Let 
S j, t+1 i denote the number of shares of stock j 
held by country i at the end of period t. At 
date t, the country i household faces the fol-
lowing budget constraint:
(8)  P i, t  C i, t +  p i, t S  S i, t+1 i +  p j, t S  S j, t+1 i 
 =  w i, t  l i, t + ( d i, t +  p i, t S ) S i, t i 
 + ( d j, t +  p j, t S ) S j, t i , j ≠ i,
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where  p i, t S is the price of stock i. 
Household Decisions and  
Market Clearing Conditions
Each household selects portfolios, con-
sumptions and labor supplies that maximize 
her lifetime utility (2) subject to her budget 
constraint (8) for t ≥ 0. The following equa-
tions are first-order conditions of that deci-
sion problem:
(9)   c i, t i = a (  p i, t  _ P i, t  ) −ϕ C i, t ,
  c j, t i = (1 − a) (  p j, t  ___ P i, t ) −ϕ C i, t , 
  l i, t 
ω
  =  (  w i, t  ___ P i, t )  C i, t −σ 
(10) 1 =  E t [ β (  C i, t+1  _ C i, t   ) −σ  P i, t  _____  P i, t+1   p j, t+1 S +  d j, t+1   ___________ p j, t S  ] 
 for j = H, F.
Equation (9) represents the optimal alloca-
tion of consumption spending across goods, 
and the labor supply decision. Equation (10) 
shows the Euler equations with respect to 
the two stocks.
Market-clearing in goods and asset mar-
kets requires:
(11)  c H, t H +  c H, t F =  y H, t ,  c F, t F +  c F, t H =  y F, t , 
(12)  S H, t H +  S H, t F =  S F, t F +  S F, t H = 1.
4.1.2 Zero-Order Equilibrium Portfolios
Equilibrium portfolio holdings chosen at 
date t ( S i, t+1 i ,  S j, t+1 i ) are functions of state 
variables at date t. Devereux and Sutherland 
(2011) show how to compute Taylor expan-
sion of the portfolio decision rules, in the 
neighborhood of the deterministic steady 
state. In this section, we provide closed 
form solutions for “zero-order portfolios” 
(denoted by variables without time sub-
scripts)  S i i,  S j i, i.e., portfolio decision rules 
evaluated at steady-state values of state vari-
ables. These portfolios can be determined 
by linearizing the model around its deter-
ministic steady state. We show that the asset 
structure (two assets with two exogenous 
shocks) is locally complete in the sense that 
up to a first-order linear approximation, the 
consumption allocation is efficient (in other 
words there is perfect risk sharing up to a 
first-order approximation of the model). 
The method we use to solve for portfolios 
is then slightly different from Devereux and 
Sutherland (2011) as it does not require a sec-
ond-order expansion of the Euler equations 
(equation 10). We simply derive the portfolio 
that replicates the efficient allocation up to 
a first-order approximation of the nonport-
folio equations. This method is simpler but 
less general than Devereux and Sutherland 
(2011) as theirs can also be applied in models 
with incomplete financial markets.
Log-Linearization of the Model
In what follows,  z t ≡   z H, t  _ z F, t  denotes the 
ratio of Home over Foreign variables; 
 ˆ  z t ≡ ( z t − z)/z denotes the relative deviation 
of a variable  z t from its steady-state value z.
The Home country’s CPI-based real 
exchange is RE R t ≡   P H, t  _ P F, t  . Linearizing this 
expression gives (using (4)): 
(13)  ˆ  RE R t =  ˆ  P H, t −  ˆ  P F, t =  ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t,
where  q t ≡  p H, t / p F, t denotes the country H 
terms of trade. Due to consumption home 
bias (a >  1 _2), an improvement of Home terms 
of trade generates an appreciation of the 
Home real exchange rate (without home bias 
in consumption, the real exchange rate is 
constant).
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In an equilibrium with locally complete 
markets, the ratio of Home and Foreign 
marginal utilities of aggregate consumption 
is proportional to the consumption-based 
real exchange rate (Backus and Smith 1993; 
Kollmann 1995). Linearization of this risk 
sharing condition gives: 
(14) −σ( ˆ  C H, t −  ˆ  C F, t) =  ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t .
Using intratemporal first-order condition 
for consumption (9) and market-clearing 
condition (11), one can show that when (14) 
holds, relative world consumption demand is 
given by  y t =  y H, t / y F, t ≡ ( c H, t H +  c H, t F )/( c F, t F + 
c F, t H ) and satisfies in log-linearized terms:12 
(15)  ˆ  y t =
  − [ ϕ ( 1 −  ( 2a − 1 ) 2 ) +  ( 2a − 1 ) 2 1 __σ ]  ˆ  q t
   ≡ −λ  ˆ  q t,
where λ ≡ ϕ(1 −  ( 2a − 1 ) 2 ) +   ( 2a − 1 ) 2  _σ  > 0. 
Thus Home terms of trade worsen when the 
relative supply of Home goods increases as 
Foreign goods are scarcer.
Ex ante symmetry implies that the zero-
order portfolios have to satisfy these con-
ditions: S ≡  S H H =  S F F = 1 −  S H F = 1 −  S F H ; S 
describes the (zero-order) equilibrium equity 
portfolio. Note that S denotes a country’s 
holdings of local stock.
We will show that there exists a unique 
portfolio S, which, for consumptions con-
sistent with the linearized risk-sharing con-
dition (14), satisfies the following “static” 
budget constraint:
(16)  P i, t  C i, t =  w i, t  l i, t + S d i, t + (1 − S) d j, t ,
 for i = H, F.
12 See Coeurdacier (2009) and Coeurdacier, Kollmann, 
Martin (2008) for similar expressions.
Up to the first order, country i’s efficient 
consumption spending at date t equals date 
t wage income,  w i, t  l i, t , plus the financial 
income generated by the equity portfolio S.13
Subtracting the “static” budget constraint 
of country F from that of country H and 
using the risk-sharing condition (14) yields 
the following log-linearized “static” budget 
constraint:
(17) ( ˆ  P H, t  C H, t −  ˆ  P F, t  C F, t) 
   =  ( 1 −  1 __σ)  ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t
 3
  ˆ  RE R t
   = (1 − α) ˆ w t  l t +  ( 2S − 1 ) α ˆ d t,
where  ˆ w t  l t ≡  ˆ w H, t  l H, t −  ˆ w F, t  l F, t denotes 
relative labor income and  ˆ d t ≡  ˆ d H, t −  ˆ d F, t
denotes the relative dividend.
This expression shows the changes in 
country H income (relative to the income of 
F) necessary to finance the changes in con-
sumption consistent with efficient risk-shar-
ing (up to first order).
Partial Equilibrium Zero-Order Portfolios
The “static” budget constraint is useful to 
derive the equilibrium portfolio as a function 
of variance/covariance ratios. Taking the cova-
riance with  ˆ d t in (18) gives the following port-
folio (we implicitly assume that the equity 
portfolio supports efficient risk-sharing up to 
a first-order, which is verified below):
(18) S =  1 __
2
−  1 __
2
  
( 1 − α )  _______α  
cov( ˆ w t  l t,  
ˆ
 d t) 
var( ˆ d t)
  
 +  1 __
2
 
(1 −  1 _ σ ) α   
cov( ˆ  RER ,  ˆ d t)  
var( ˆ d t)
  .
13 Kollmann (2006b) and Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and 
Martin (2010) shows that if this “static” budget constraint 
holds, then the present value budget constraint of country 
i is likewise satisfied, up to a first order.
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This expression holds in many classes of 
models (with equity only) as we only need 
the budget constraints and generic first-
order conditions to derive it. It is the depar-
ture of many empirical studies. The same 
expression also holds in terms of returns 
instead of income flows.
The portfolio departs from the fully diversi-
fied one with weights 1/2 in both equities (as 
in Lucas 1982) in presence of labor income 
risk and/or real exchange rate risk. It indicates 
that investors would favor local equity if:
(i) Relative dividends covary negatively 
with (relative) labor income (term  cov( 
ˆ
 w t  lt ,  
ˆ
 d t) ______
var( ˆ d t)
 ). 
This term is referred as the hedging of non-
tradable income risk.
As labor income accounts for more than 
two-thirds of total income, this term might 
lead to potentially large portfolio biases, the 
covariance term being multiplied by  1 − α ___α . 
Households cannot trade financial claims 
on their labor incomes and will use existing 
financial assets to hedge this nontradable 
income risk. Intuitively, households want to 
insure themselves against a fall in their labor 
incomes and in the returns to their human 
wealth by holding financial assets that pay 
more in these bad states. If local equities 
have higher returns (than abroad) when 
local returns to nontradable wealth are lower 
(than abroad), households will bias their 
portfolio toward local equities.
(ii) Relative dividends covary posi-
tively with the real exchange rate if σ > 1 
(term   cov( ˆ  RER ,  
ˆ
 d t) _______
var( ˆ d t)
 ). This term is referred as 
the hedging of real exchange rate risk. 
The optimal hedging of real exchange rate 
risk depends on two forces going in oppo-
site directions: when local goods are more 
expensive, consumers need to generate more 
income in order to stabilize their purchasing 
power. On the other hand, since local goods 
are more expensive, households could 
be better off consuming when goods are 
cheaper. The dominating effect depends on 
how much households want to smooth their 
consumption across states. For consumers 
sufficiently risk-averse (σ > 1), the former 
effect dominates and households want to 
increase their income when their consump-
tion goods are more expensive. Thus, they 
build their portfolio by choosing assets with a 
high pay-off when local goods are expensive. 
For the log-investor (σ = 1), the two effects 
cancel out and the hedging term disappears.
General Equilibrium Zero-Order Portfolios
Note that equation (18) is a partial equi-
librium expression. In general equilibrium 
macro models, the above variance/covari-
ance terms can be expressed as a function 
of the underlying parameters of the model. 
Since labor income and dividends are a con-
stant share of output ((6) and (7)), relative 
labor income ( ˆ w t  l t) and dividends ( 
ˆ
 d t) are 
equal and given by:  ˆ w t  l t =  ˆ d t =  ˆ  q t +  ˆ  y t.
Substituting into (17) and using (15) gives: 
(19)  ( 1 −  1 __σ) ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t
   =  { (1 − α) + α ( 2S − 1 ) } ( ˆ  q t +  ˆ  y t)
   =  { (1 − α) + α ( 2S − 1 ) } (1 − λ) ˆ  q t .
The asset structure supports full risk-sharing, 
up to first-order, if (19) holds for all realiza-
tions of the (relative) exogenous productivity 
shocks ( ˆ  θ t) (or equivalently all realizations of 
the terms-of-trade  ˆ  q t). The following port-
folio S ensures that (19) holds for arbitrary 
realizations of  ˆ  q t: 
(20) S =  1 __
2
−  1 __
2
  
( 1 − α )  _______α 
 −  1 __
2
(1 −  1 __σ)  ( 2a − 1 )  ________α ( λ − 1 )  .
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The equilibrium portfolio is the sum of 
three terms:
(i) The first term  1 _2 is a pure diversifica-
tion term. It would prevail if there 
were no hedging motives as in Lucas 
(1982). In the absence of heteroge-
neity across investors, there is full 
diversification of national output risk. 
We derive the Lucas portfolio when 
α → 1 (no human capital risk) and 
when a = 1/2 (no real exchange rate 
risk).
(ii) The second term −  1 _2   ( 1 − α )  ____α is the 
hedging of nontradable income risk 
(as in Baxter and Jermann (1997)): 
changes in output driven by produc-
tivity shocks are shared in constant 
proportion (Cobb–Douglas produc-
tion). This leads to a perfect corre-
lation between labor incomes and 
capital incomes: households should 
short the local stock to hedge human 
capital risk. Note that in the present 
model, the portfolio is exactly the 
one of Baxter and Jermann (1997) 
in the absence of real exchange rate 
risk (a = 1/2).
(iii) The third term −  1 _2(1 −  1 _σ)   ( 2a − 1 )  _____α ( λ − 1 )   is 
the hedging of real exchange rate 
risk. This term is the same as the one 
derived in Coeurdacier (2009) and 
Kollmann (2006b) in the absence of 
human capital risk (α → 1). This term 
cancels out for a log-investor (σ = 1). 
As explained above (see equation 18), 
investors bias their portfolio toward 
equities that have high returns when 
local goods are more expensive (if 
σ > 1). The appropriate portfolio 
depends on the value of λ i.e., on the 
elasticity of substitution ϕ. Three dif-
ferent cases emerge:
 (a)  λ > 1 (i.e., an elasticity of substi-
tution ϕ roughly above unity): the 
hedging of real exchange rate risk 
generates a Foreign equity bias. 
The reason is the following: a (rel-
ative) fall in local output driven 
by a bad productivity shock trig-
gers a moderate increase in the 
Home terms-of-trade, a moder-
ate appreciation of the Home 
real exchange rate together with a 
decrease in Home equity returns: 
Foreign equities are more valu-
able since they have higher (rela-
tive) returns despite the Home 
real exchange rate appreciation.
 (b)  λ < 1 (i.e., elasticity of substitu-
tion ϕ, roughly below unity): a 
(relative) fall in local output trig-
gers a stronger improvement of 
the Home terms-of-trade and 
a stronger appreciation of the 
Home real exchange rate. As the 
relative price response is stron-
ger, Home equity excess returns 
increase. Home investors exhibit 
Home equity bias as Home equity 
have higher returns when the 
Home real exchange rate appre-
ciates. This is the case empha-
sized by Kollmann (2006b).
 (c)  λ = 1: Any increase in local out-
put is perfectly offset by a fall in 
the terms-of-trade. Both equi-
ties are perfect substitutes and 
there is portfolio indeterminacy. 
This is an extension of Cole and 
Obstfeld’s (1991) result.
4.1.3 Related Literature 
 Hedging Real Exchange Rate Risk
As appears clearly in the previous model, 
optimal portfolios are structured to hedge 
the risk arising from real exchange rate 
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fluctuations. This is at the heart of the poten-
tial divergence of portfolios across investors 
in the partial equilibrium portfolio choice 
models with real exchange rate risk. The key 
issue is whether local equities are a good 
hedge against relative price (real exchange 
rate) fluctuations, i.e., whether local equi-
ties have higher returns when local goods 
are (relatively) more expensive. If this is the 
case, then local investors should favor local 
equities. Early examples of this hypothesis 
are Solnik (1974), Adler and Dumas (1983), 
Krugman (1981), Braga de Macedo (1983), 
de Macedo, Goldstein, and Meerschwam 
(1985) and Stulz (1981). Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1994) start with the premise that 
for equity home bias to be rooted in a desire 
to hedge against relative inflation, equity 
returns need to be positively correlated with 
inflation. They test for such a correlation and 
reject it for all countries considered. These 
early papers take relative prices (and the real 
exchange rate) and asset returns as given 
while in the present model and, more gener-
ally in the recent Open Economy Financial 
Macroeconomics, the dynamics of goods 
prices and asset returns is endogenous, as is 
the covariance between the two.
In the more recent literature, some con-
tributions focus on the hedging of the rela-
tive price of tradables (terms-of-trade, as in 
the present model) and some focus on the 
hedging of the relative price of nontrad-
able goods. In their influential contribution, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) argue that trade 
costs in goods markets help to solve the 
equity home bias puzzle. The above model 
(in line with Coeurdacier 2009)14 shows 
the opposite result for most parameter val-
ues (in particular for ϕ and σ above unity). 
Indeed, in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), the 
14 The model presented features home bias in prefer-
ences instead of trade costs. A functional transformation of 
trade costs would however make the two types of models 
isomorphic.
coefficient of risk aversion is below unity 
(and equal to the inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution between the two goods), which 
allows to solve the model in closed-form. 
With such preferences, agents prefer to 
hold local equities which pay less when local 
consumption is expensive. A similar point is 
made by Uppal (1993) in a two-country/one-
good model in continuous time with trade 
costs: he shows that home bias only arises 
for the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
smaller than one. One can potentially restore 
the argument of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) 
in the present model if σ is above 1 but the 
elasticity of substitution between goods ϕ 
is below unity. In that case, a fall in Home 
supply triggers a very large increase in the 
Home terms-of-trade such that Home equity 
returns are high when prices of Home goods 
are high. Hence, investors would rather hold 
local equities (see Kollmann 2006b). In this 
class of models, equity home bias relies on 
the response of relative prices, i.e., on the 
elasticity of substitution between local and 
foreign products. While time series macro 
data estimating the response of trade to 
exchange rate changes suggests a low elastic-
ity of substitution, between 0.5 and 1.5 (see 
Hooper and Marquez 1995, Backus, Kehoe, 
and Kydland 1994, and Heathcote and Perri 
2002), bilateral sectoral trade data suggests a 
large elasticity—above 5 for most sectors (see 
Harrigan 1993, Hummels 2001 and Baier 
and Bergstrand 2001 among others).15 The 
parameter uncertainty makes it hard to get 
a conclusive answer from this class of mod-
els. It is also important to note that output 
fluctuations in all these classes of models are 
driven by supply shocks. In the presence of 
demand shocks, equilibrium portfolios could 
turn out to be different: when local demand 
15 Imbs and Mejean (2009) claim that the discrepancy 
between macro and micro estimates comes from an aggre-
gation bias; correcting for this bias, they find an elasticity 
of up to 7.
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is high, both prices of local goods and pay-
offs of local firms increase. Hence, demand 
shocks can generate positive comovements 
between local equity returns and the price 
of local goods (see Pavlova and Rigobon 
2007). In order to be able to consume when 
demand is high, local investors would prefer 
local equities.
Similarly, the presence of nontradable 
consumption exposes domestic agents to real 
exchange rate risk (driven by fluctuations 
in the relative price of nontradable goods). 
Stockman and Dellas (1989) develop a two-
country model with endowment economies. 
Each country has random endowments of a 
(single) traded good and a nontraded good. 
There is trade in equities of tradable and 
nontradable goods firm. With utility sepa-
rable in tradable and nontradable consump-
tion, optimal portfolios imply that domestic 
agents hold all of the equity of domestic 
nontradable firms. By holding all of the 
equity of nontraded goods, domestic agents 
hold an asset whose return is perfectly cor-
related with their expenditure on nontraded 
goods. Domestic agents hold the same share 
of Home and Foreign equity of tradable 
firms, implying perfect diversification in the 
tradable sector as in Lucas (1982). Thus, this 
model generates home bias in equity posi-
tions, and the home bias increases in the 
share of nontradable consumption in total 
output. Various papers have extended this 
framework to more general preferences, 
investigating in particular the nonsepara-
bility between tradable and  nontradable 
 consumption together with multiple trad-
able goods (see Baxter, Jermann, and 
King 1998, Serrat 2001,16 Obstfeld 2007, 
Matsumoto 2007, and Collard et al. 2007).17 
In these papers, the presence of nontrad-
able consumption interacts with tradable 
consumption and some degree of home bias 
in nontradable equities obtains. The precise 
structure of portfolios is strongly dependent 
on preference parameters, in particular the 
substitution elasticities between tradable 
and nontradable goods (and also between 
domestic and foreign tradable goods). The 
mechanism at the heart of the home bias 
toward nontradable equity is however essen-
tially similar to the one described in the pre-
vious model: investors want to hold equities 
whose payoff is high when the real exchange 
rate appreciates, i.e., when the consumption 
of nontradable goods is expensive. It turns 
out that for a sufficiently low elasticity of 
substitution between tradable and nontrad-
able goods (roughly below unity as found in 
the empirical literature),18 a fall in local non-
tradable output implies a strong increase 
in the relative price of nontradable goods 
together with an increase in local nontrad-
able equity returns: hence, local nontrad-
able equity returns comove positively with 
the price of nontradable goods (and the real 
exchange rate), leading to local equity bias 
in that sector.
On the empirical front, Pesenti and van 
Wincoop (2002) derive an expression that 
relates home bias to the correlation between 
equity returns and nontradable consumption 
16 See also Kollmann (2006a) for a comment.
17 In earlier work, Eldor, Pines, and Schwartz (1988), 
in a general equilibrium model, study n countries, each 
producing a nontradable good and the single tradable 
good that is consumed in all countries. The assets traded 
are “real equities” for the tradable and nontradable good. 
Tradable equities pay one unit of the traded good in each 
state of the world, while nontradable equity pays out θ 
units of the nontradable good, where θ is state contingent 
nontradable output. They point out that for home bias to 
arise the returns of nontraded equities have to be positively 
correlated with the price of the nontradable good and 
derive conditions for the risk aversion parameter, the price 
elasticity of demand for tradable goods and the income 
elasticity of demand for tradable goods such that it would 
be the case.
18 Typical values used for the elasticity of substitu-
tion between tradable and nontradable goods are: 0.44 
(Stockman and Tesar 1995), 0.74 (Mendoza 1995), from 
0.6 to 0.8 (Serrat 2001). Ostry and Reinhart (1992) provide 
estimates for developing countries in the range of 0.6 to 
1.4. See Matsumoto (2007) for a more detailed discussion.
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growth19 and using data on fourteen OECD 
countries from 1970 to 1993, they find 
that, on average, nontradable consump-
tion growth is positively correlated with the 
return on domestic capital. This would imply 
that home bias would arise if tradables and 
nontradable goods are complementary. The 
authors find, however, that even in those 
cases, hedging nontradable consumption 
could at best explain a relatively small frac-
tion of the home bias observed in the data. 
Overall, there are two empirical difficulties 
with an explanation of the equity home bias 
relying on the presence of a nontradable 
sector. The first one is that the structure of 
portfolios is strongly dependent on prefer-
ence parameters, which are not easy to esti-
mate. The second one is that the home bias 
result relies on the ability of investors to hold 
separate claims on tradable and nontradable 
output: as most products contain both trad-
able and nontradable components, shares of 
firms automatically involve joint claims on 
tradables and nontradables. This difficulty is 
made all the more relevant by the fact that, 
when agents are allowed to trade separate 
claims on tradable and nontradable output, 
optimal equity positions are very different 
across the two sectors. This different struc-
ture of portfolios across traded and non-
traded sectors seems inconsistent with casual 
empiricism as argued by Lewis (1999). More 
broadly, empirical analysis of this channel 
is also hindered by the difficulty to identify 
precisely nontradable consumption and trad-
able/nontradable equity.
There is yet another major empirical issue 
faced by this explanation of home bias. The 
hedging of real exchange rate risk leads to 
equity home bias if local equities have higher 
returns (than abroad) when local prices are 
higher (than abroad). In other words, equity 
home bias appears if excess local equity 
19 Their model also includes leisure, which drives 
another hedging motive.
returns (over foreign) increase when the 
real exchange rate appreciates (the term 
 cov( ˆ  RER ,  
ˆ
 d t) _______
var( ˆ d t)
 in equation 18). As shown by van 
Wincoop and Warnock (2010), the empirical 
correlation between excess equity returns 
and the real exchange rate is very low, too 
low to explain observed equity home bias. 
Furthermore, most of the fluctuations in 
the real exchange rate represent fluctuations 
in the nominal exchange rate: as explained 
in section 4.2, these could be hedged using 
positions in the forward currency market or 
the currency bond market. In other words, 
equities do not seem empirically to be an 
appropriate asset to insure investors against 
real exchange rate fluctuations. Hence, while 
these models are theoretically appealing, it is 
doubtful that the hedging of real exchange 
rate risk can account empirically for the 
equity home bias.
Hedging Nontradable Income Risk
In our model (see equation 18), hedging 
nontradable income risk implies picking 
stocks which have higher payoffs when labor 
income is low. The focus of the literature 
has been twofold: first, from a theoretical 
perspective, it has discussed the conditions 
under which standard macroeconomic mod-
els imply a negative or positive correlation 
between local equity returns and returns to 
nontradable wealth. Second, from an empiri-
cal perspective, a series of papers have pro-
vided estimates of the covariance between 
relative equity returns and relative returns 
to human wealth which is the key empirical 
counterpart of portfolio biases in this class of 
models.
The most influential contribution on these 
matters is Baxter and Jermann (1997), who 
argue that the presence of nontradable 
income risk worsens the equity home bias 
puzzle. Their argument goes as follows: in 
a standard multicountry real business cycle 
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model with a single tradable good and a 
Cobb–Douglas production function, changes 
in output are shared in constant proportion 
between capital and labor. Hence, labor and 
capital incomes are perfectly correlated. 
As investors are already strongly exposed 
to domestic risk due to their labor income, 
they should not hold local capital. Due to 
the relatively large labor share in all coun-
tries, the effects of hedging domestic human 
capital dominates the benefits of diversifica-
tion: investors should short-sell local equities 
(term −  1 _2  1 − α ___α  in equation 20). Hence, the 
equity home bias puzzle is worse than we 
think! The authors estimate a vector error 
correction model that allows the correlation 
between labor and capital returns to vary 
over time and be imperfect, while maintain-
ing the assumption that the ratio of labor 
to capital income is stationary. Using data 
from the OECD National Accounts (1994) 
for Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and the United States for 1960–93, they 
find that within countries, labor and capital 
returns are highly correlated, while the cor-
relation between domestic labor returns and 
foreign equity returns is quite low. Using the 
observed correlations, the authors then con-
struct diversified portfolios and find that the 
optimal position in domestic equity is nega-
tive in all the countries considered.
Their empirical findings have been chal-
lenged by a series of papers. Bottazzi, 
Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996) use a con-
tinuous time VAR model of portfolio choice 
and data on a large set of OECD countries 
and find that returns to domestic capital and 
human capital are negatively correlated for 
most countries but the United States and 
this can explain a fraction of equity home 
bias in these countries. Julliard (2002) 
argues that the Baxter and Jermann’s (1997) 
empirical findings are due to an economet-
ric misspecification: the correlation between 
returns to human capital and local equity 
returns is overstated because they implicitly 
assume that innovations to capital and labor 
incomes are independent across countries. 
Once the misspecification is corrected, 
considering human capital risk does not 
unequivocally worsen the home bias puzzle. 
Using micro-level data, Massa and Simonov 
(2006) show that nonfinancial income is 
uncorrelated with the market portfolio of 
financial assets, but actual investors’ portfo-
lios (which differ from the market portfolio) 
are more positively correlated with nonfi-
nancial income than the market portfolio is. 
Thus, the authors cast doubt on the rational-
ity of investors and on their desire to hedge 
nontradable income risk.
From a theoretical perspective, Heathcote 
and Perri (2007) show that Baxter and 
Jermann’s (1997) result relies on very strong 
assumptions: one single and perfectly trad-
able good and a fixed capital stock. Relaxing 
those assumptions (in a two-country/two-
good international real business cycle model 
à la Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1994) and 
introducing differentiated product across 
countries together with consumption/invest-
ment home bias changes drastically the pic-
ture and helps solve the EHB puzzle. Their 
result relies on two key elements: endog-
enous capital accumulation and a strong 
adjustment of relative prices.20 The main 
intuition is the following. Suppose a posi-
tive (persistent) productivity shock hits the 
Home economy. This leads to:
(i)  a fall in the relative price of Home 
goods (Foreign goods are scarcer).
(ii) an increase in Home investment 
(more than abroad) as Home invest-
ment uses more intensively cheaper 
Home goods (due to home bias in 
investment spending).
20 Endogenous capital accumulation is crucial: despite 
multiple goods, Baxter and Jermann’s (1997) results would 
survive if capital is fixed.
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(iii) an increase in Home wages (more 
than abroad) and in the Home returns 
to nontradable wealth.
(iv) a decrease in the returns on Home 
capital (relative to Foreign) if the 
(relative) price response of Home 
goods is strong enough.
The main difference with Baxter and 
Jermann (1997) is the last point (iv): if the 
market price of Home goods falls sufficiently 
and Home investment is increasing, divi-
dends distributed by Home firms (which are 
net of investment) are lower than abroad, 
and so are Home returns to capital. Hence 
the model generates negative comovements 
between Home (excess) returns to human 
wealth and Home (excess) returns to capi-
tal: hedging nontradable income risk implies 
home equity bias. Home bias in investment/
consumption spending is important as it 
triggers a stronger response of investment 
at Home, thus a larger fall of Home divi-
dends and a larger increase of Home wages. 
Importantly, the model generates a posi-
tive link between consumption home bias 
and equity home bias as found in the data.21 
Note that Heathcote and Perri (2007) focus 
on log-utility and unitary elasticity of substi-
tution between Home and Foreign goods. 
Increasing the level of risk aversion intro-
duces a real exchange rate risk motive as in 
Coeurdacier (2009) and Kollmann (2006b). 
Increasing the elasticity of substitution 
reduces the response of relative prices and 
makes the portfolio converge toward the one 
of Baxter and Jermann (1997).
21 Lane (2000), Aizenman (2004), and Heathcote and 
Perri (2007), among others, show a positive relationship 
between trade openness and foreign equity holdings look-
ing at a cross section of countries. Portes and Rey (2005), 
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2008) show that country equity portfolios are 
strongly biased toward trading partners.
4.2 Hedging Motives in a Benchmark Model 
with Multiple Asset Classes (Bonds and 
Equities)
4.2.1 Hedging with Bond and Equities: 
 The Role of “Conditional Risk”
The first generation of papers presented 
above focus on equity positions to rationalize 
home bias. However, equities are only part of 
financial assets traded internationally. Debt 
securities (nominal bonds in different curren-
cies, corporate bonds, bank deposits, . . . ) are 
instruments that can also be used to share 
risks internationally (see section 7). They 
should not be excluded from our models, 
first for realism, since they constitute a large 
share of international asset flows but above 
all because there might be substitution across 
asset classes. Hence, equity positions derived 
in equity only models might be sensitive to 
the presence of other financial assets. Recent 
models with portfolio decisions have incor-
porated multiple assets (equities and bonds) 
to have more robust and realistic predic-
tions.22 Nominal bond returns differentials 
across countries are (almost) perfectly cor-
related with the real exchange rate (in devel-
oped countries, fluctuations in the nominal 
exchange rate account for most of the fluc-
tuations in the real exchange rate). Hence, 
bonds are better suited than equities to 
hedge real exchange rate risk. But this is not 
the end of the story. The presence of bonds 
also affects the hedging properties of equi-
ties for nontradable income risk. Equities 
are used to hedge sources of risks that can-
not be hedged through the bond positions, 
in particular the part of nontradable income 
risk that is orthogonal to bond returns. In 
22 As described in section 4.2.5, recent contributions 
with multiple asset classes include Engel and Matsumoto 
(2009a, 2009b), Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin (2008 
and 2010), Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011), Berriel 
and Bhattarai (2008), and Devereux and Sutherland (2007 
and 2008).
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this new  literature, the optimal equity posi-
tion depends therefore on the correlation of 
returns on equity with returns on nontrad-
able income, conditional on bond returns.
4.2.2 Set-up of the Model
We use a similar set up as in section 4.1 but 
we add two important ingredients to formal-
ize our above discussion on hedging motives: 
endogenous capital accumulation and trade 
in real bonds. They allow us to overcome 
the limitations of the model presented in 
4.1: first, endogenous investment in a two-
good model breaks the perfect link between 
returns on physical capital and returns on 
human capital; second, bond trading modi-
fies the hedging properties of equities. 
Bonds will be used to hedge fluctuations in 
the real exchange rate. Equities will be used 
to hedge nontradable income risk, condition-
ally on bond returns. This model is similar 
Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin (2010), 
which extends Heathcote and Perri (2007) to 
multiple asset classes (bonds and equities).
In presence of productivity shocks only, 
we would face a portfolio indeterminacy in a 
first-order approximation of the nonportfolio 
equations since the number of available assets 
(bonds and equities in each country) would 
exceed the exogenous sources of uncertainty. 
We have to add an additional source of uncer-
tainty. We choose to add shocks to the disu-
tility of leisure for simplicity. As explained in 
Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin (2010) 
and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011), the 
nature of the additional shock used to alle-
viate portfolio indeterminacy is irrelevant 
for the portfolio and results would survive 
with other shocks commonly used (shocks to 
investment à la Greenwood, Hercowitz, and 
Huffman 1988, depreciation shocks, shocks 
to capacity utilization . . . ).23
23 Obviously, a different shock will have different busi-
ness cycles implications but we are presently not interested 
in those.
Hence, preferences are now defined by
(21)  E 0  ∑ 
t=0
 
∞
  β t (  C i, t 1−σ  _1 − σ  −  χ i, t   l i, t 1+ω  _ 1 + ω ) ,
where  χ i, t is an exogenous shock to the disu-
tility of labor.
Technologies and Capital Accumulation
As before, production in each country uses 
capital and labor with a Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction function:
(22)   y i, t =  θ i, t ( k i, t ) α ( l i, t ) 1−α . 
The law of motion of the capital stock is:
(23)  k i, t+1 = (1 − δ) k i, t +  I i, t ,
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of 
capital.  I i, t is gross investment in country i at 
date t. In both countries, gross investment is 
generated using Home and Foreign inputs:
(24)  I i, t =
 [  a 1/ϕ ( i i, t i )  ( ϕ−1 ) /ϕ + (1 − a ) 1/ϕ ( i j, t i ) (ϕ−1)/ϕ ] ϕ/(ϕ−1) ,
j ≠ i, 
where  i j, t i is the amount of good j used for 
investment in country i. We assume local 
bias for investment spending (identical to the 
one for consumption),24  1 _2 < a < 1. The asso-
ciated investment price index is the same as 
for consumption  P i, t (see equation 4).
24 See Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin (2010) 
and Castello (2009) for a model where bias in invest-
ment spending is different from the bias in consumption 
spending.
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Firms’ Decisions
A share 1 − α of output at market prices 
is paid to workers as in equation (6). A share 
α of country i output, net of physical invest-
ment spending is paid as a dividend  d i, t to 
shareholders: 
(25)  d i, t = α  p i, t  y i, t −  P i, t  I i, t .
The firm chose  I i, t to equate the expected 
future marginal gain of investment to the 
marginal cost. This implies the following 
first-order condition:25 
(26)  P i, t = β  E t [ ( C i, t+1 / C i, t ) −σ ( P i, t / P i, t+1 )
 × [  p i, t+1 θ i, t+1 α  k i, t+1 α−1 l i, t+1 1−α + (1 − δ) P i, t+1 ] ] . 
The firm chooses the Home and Foreign 
investment inputs  i i, t i ,  i j, t i that minimize the 
cost of generating  I i, t . This leads to the fol-
lowing intratemporal allocation for invest-
ment goods:
(27)   i i, t i = a (  p i, t  ___ P i, t I  ) −ϕ  I i, t ,
  i j, t i = (1 − a) (  p j, t  ___ P i, t ) −ϕ  I i, t , j ≠ i.
Financial Markets and Instantaneous 
Budget Constraint
There is now international trade in stocks 
and (real) bonds. Stocks in country i rep-
resents a claim to its stream of dividends 
{ d i, t }. There is a bond denominated in the 
Home good, and a bond denominated in the 
Foreign good. Buying one unit of the Home 
(Foreign) bond in period t gives one unit of 
25 Note that we use the intertemporal marginal rate 
of substitution of the country i household for investment 
decisions in country i. This assumption is however irrele-
vant here since up-to the degree of the approximation, the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the country i 
household and the country j household are the same.
the Home (Foreign) good in all future peri-
ods. Both bonds are in zero net supply. We 
denote by  S j, t+1 i the number of shares of 
stock j held by country i at the end of period 
t, while  B j, t+1 i represents claims held by 
country i (at the end of t) to future uncon-
ditional payments of good j. At date t, the 
country i household now faces the following 
budget constraint:
(28)  P i, t  C i, t +  p i, t S  S i, t+1 i +  p j, t S  S j, t+1 i 
 +  p j, t B  B j, t+1 i +  p i, t B  B i, t+1 i 
 =  w i, t  l i, t + ( d i, t +  p i, t S ) S i, t i 
 + ( d j, t +  p i, t S ) S j, t i 
 + ( p i, t +  p i, t B ) B i, t i 
 + ( p j, t +  p j, t B ) B j, t i , j ≠ i, 
where  p i, t S is the price of stock i and  p i, t B is the 
price of bond i.
Household Decisions and Market 
Clearing Conditions
Households’ first-order conditions for that 
decision problem are still given by (9) and 
(10). One needs to add the Euler equations 
for the two bonds:
(29) 1 =  E t β (  C i, t+1  _____ C i, t  ) −σ  P i, t  _____  P i, t+1   p j, t+1 B +  p j, t+1   ___________ p j, t B  
 for j = H, F.
Market-clearing in goods and asset mar-
kets now requires:
(30)   c H, t H +  c H, t F +  i H, t H +  i H, t F =  y H, t , 
  c F, t F +  c F, t H +  i F, t F +  i F, t H =  y F, t , 
(31)  S H, t H +  S H, t F =  S F, t F +  S F, t H = 1, 
  B H, t H +  B H, t F =  B F, t F +  B F, t H = 0.
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4.2.3 Zero-Order Equilibrium Portfolios
As in section 4.1, equilibrium portfolio 
holdings ( S i, t+1 i ,  S j, t+1 i ,  B i, t+1 i ,  B j, t+1 i ) can be 
determined by linearizing the model around 
its deterministic steady state. With the asset 
structure here (four assets with four exog-
enous shocks), efficient risk sharing can be 
replicated up to the first-order (locally com-
plete markets).
Linearization of the Model
We use the same notation as in section 4.1. 
Equations 13 and 14 still hold.
Linearization of the relative demand for 
investment  y I, t ≡   i H, t 
H +  i H, t F  _
 i F, t F +  i F, t H   gives (using the 
intratemporal allocation across investment 
goods (27)):
(32)  ˆ  y I, t = −ϕ ( 1 −  ( 2 a I − 1 ) 2 )  ˆ  q t + (2a − 1) ˆ  I t, 
where  I t ≡  I H, t / I F, t is relative real aggregate 
investment. Holding constant the terms of 
trade, the relative demand for Home invest-
ment goods,  y I, t , increases with relative real 
investment in the Home country,  I t , since 
Home aggregate investment is biased toward 
the Home good (a >  1 _2).
The relative demand for consumption 
 ˆ  y C, t is still defined by (from (15)):
(33)  ˆ  y C, t
  = − [ ϕ ( 1 −  ( 2a − 1 ) 2 ) +  ( 2a − 1 ) 2 1 _ σ ]  ˆ  q t
 ≡ − λ  ˆ  q t.
The market clearing condition for goods 
(30), together with (32) and (33) implies: 
(34) (1 −  s I )  ˆ  y C, t +  s I  ˆ  y I, t
   = −μ  ˆ  q t +  s I (2 a I − 1) ˆ  I t =  ˆ  y t,
where
μ = ϕ(1 −  ( 2a − 1 ) 2 ) + (1 −  s I )   ( 2a − 1 ) 2  _____σ > 0 
and  s I ≡   P H I  I H  ___ p H  y H =   P F 
I
  I F  ___ p F  y F is the steady-state invest-
ment/GDP ratio.
Not surprisingly, Home terms of trade 
worsen when the relative supply of Home 
goods increases, for a given amount of rela-
tive Home country investment. Home terms 
of trade improve when Home investment 
rises (due to home bias in investment spend-
ing), for a given value of the relative Home/
Foreign output.
Ex ante symmetry implies that the zero-
order portfolios have to satisfy the following 
conditions: S ≡  S H H =  S F F = 1 −  S H F = 1 −  S F H ; 
B ≡  B H H =  B F F = − B H F = − B F H . The pair (S; B) 
thus describes the (zero-order) equilibrium 
portfolio. B denotes a country holdings of 
bonds denominated in its local good. B > 0 
means that a country is long in local-good 
bonds (and short in foreign good bonds).
As before, there exists a unique portfo-
lio (S; B) that satisfies the following “static” 
budget constraint, for consumptions that are 
consistent with the linearized risk sharing 
condition (14):
(35)  P i, t  C i, t =  w i, t  l i, t + S d i, t 
 + (1 − S) d j, t + B( p i, t −  p j, t ),
 for i = H, F.
Country i’s efficient consumption spending 
at date t equals date t wage income,  w i, t  l i, t , 
plus the financial income generated by the 
portfolio (S; B). 
Subtracting the “static” budget constraint 
of country F from that of country H and lin-
earizing gives:26
26 We assume α >  s I  to have strictly positive dividends 
in the steady state.
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(36) (1 −  s I )( ˆ  P H, t  C H, t −  ˆ  P F, t  C F, t) 
   = (1 −  s I ) ( 1 −  1 __σ)  ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t
 3
  ˆ  RE R t
   = (1 − α) ˆ w t  lt +  ( 2S − 1 ) (α −  s I ) ˆ d t
 + 2b  ˆ  q t,
where b =  B _y denotes holdings of debt de-
nominated in local good, divided by steady-
state GDP.
Partial Equilibrium Zero-Order Portfolios
Like in the previous model, one can derive 
from the “static” budget constraint (36) a par-
tial equilibrium portfolio that expresses the 
hedging terms in terms of covariance–vari-
ance ratios. This expression holds in a large 
class of models with bonds and equities.
Projection of (36) on  ˆ d t and  ˆ  q t gives the 
 following expression for the portfolio of 
bonds and equities (S, b):
(37) S =  1 _ 
2 [ 1 −  1 − α _α −  s I    Cov   q  ( ˆ w t  l t,  ˆ d t)  _Va r   q  ( ˆ d t)  
 +  ( 1 −  1 _ σ )  ( 1 −  s I  _α −  s I  )  Co v   q  ( ˆ  RER t,  ˆ d t)  __ Va r   q  ( ˆ d t) ] 
(38) b =  1 _ 
2 [ (1 −  s I ) ( 1 −  1 _ σ )  Co v   d  ( ˆ  RER t,  ˆ  q t)  __ Va r   d  ( ˆ  q t) 
 − (1 − α)   Cov   d  ( 
ˆ
 w t  l t,  ˆ  q t)  _
Va r   d  ( ˆ  q t)
  ] ,
where Co v  ˆ  z t ( ˆ  x t,  ˆ  y t) is the covariance between 
 ˆ  x t and  ˆ  y t conditional on the pay-off  ˆ  z t.
The bond and equity portfolios depend on 
the hedging of the two sources of risk: real 
exchange rate risk ( ˆ  RE R t) and nontradable 
income risk ( ˆ w t  l t). Each portfolio (S and 
b) is structured such that investors exploit 
covariances of the assets payoffs with the 
two sources of risk. However, there is a key 
difference with the previous model with 
equities: the covariance of asset payments 
with the real exchange rate risk and labor 
income risk is conditional on payments of 
the other assets. This finding has two main 
implications.
First, real exchange rate hedging is done 
via the bond position since bond return dif-
ferentials across countries are almost per-
fectly correlated with the real exchange rate 
(see Coeurdacier and Gourinchas 2011). 
In the present model with real bonds, the 
correlation is perfect and the real exchange 
rate hedging term on the equity position 
 ( Co v   q  ( ˆ  RE R t,  ˆ d t)/Va r   q  ( ˆ d t) ) will be exactly 
zero.
Second, while the covariance of local equity 
returns with returns on nontradable wealth 
can be positive (as in Baxter and Jermann 
1997), this has no implication for the equity 
portfolio, only the covariance conditional on 
bond returns matters. As discussed below, it 
turns out that the latter tends to be negative 
in the data.
General Equilibrium Zero-Order Portfolios
We now turn to the zero-order portfolio as 
a function of the model parameters. Relative 
labor income ( ˆ w t  l t) is still given by:  
ˆ
 w t  l t=  ˆ  q t +  ˆ  y t. Due to the presence of endog-
enous investment, relative dividends ( ˆ d t) are 
now given by (using (25)): 
(39)  ˆ d t =  α ______ α −  s I ( ˆ  q t +  ˆ  y t) 
 −   s I  ______ α −  s I ( ˆ  P H, t  I H, t −  ˆ  P F, t  I F, t)
 =  α ______ α −  s I ( ˆ  q t +  ˆ  y t) 
 −   s I  ______ α −  s I ( ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t +  ˆ  I t) .
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Hence, using (34), we can reexpress (36) as 
follows: 
(40) (1 −  s I ) ( 1 −  1 _ σ ) ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t
  = [(1 − α) + α ( 2S − 1 ) ]((1 − μ)  ˆ  q t
 +  s I (2a − 1) ˆ  I t) 
 −  s I ( 2S − 1 ) [ ( 2a − 1 )  ˆ  q t +  ˆ  I t] + 2b ˆ  q t.
The asset structure supports full risk sharing, 
up to first-order, if (40) holds for all realiza-
tions of the two (relative) exogenous shocks 
( ˆ  θ t,  ˆ  χ t). To solve for that portfolio, we do not 
have to solve for output and investment, as 
a unique pair of terms of trade and relative 
real investment ( ˆ  q t,  ˆ  I t) is associated with each 
realizations of ( ˆ  θ t,  ˆ  χ t).
The following portfolio (S, b) ensures that 
(40) holds for arbitrary realizations of ( ˆ  q t,  ˆ  I t) :
(41) S =  1 __
2[ 1 +  (2a − 1)(1 − α)  ______________1 − (2a − 1)α ] >  1 __2, 
(42) b =  1 __
2[ (1 −  s I ) ( 1 −  1 _ σ ) ( 2a − 1 ) 
 +   ( 1 − α )  [ μ − 1 +  s I (2 a I − 1 ) 2 ]    __________________________
1 − (2a − 1)α ] . 
The equity portfolio features home bias 
and is the sum of two terms only. The hedg-
ing-term for the real exchange rate is indeed 
zero in this model since relative price move-
ments are fully hedged by the appropriate 
(real) bond position (cross-country differen-
tials in bond payments are perfectly corre-
lated with the real exchange rate).
(i) The first term  1 _2 is still the Lucas (1982) 
term which prevails in the absence of 
nontradable income risk  ( α → 1 ) 
(ii) The second term  (2a − 1)(1 − α) ________
1 − (2a − 1)α is the
  hedging of nontradable income risk 
conditionally on bond payments: this 
term is unambiguously positive and 
drives home equity bias in the model. 
To understand this term, assume a 
combination of shocks ( ˆ  θ t,  ˆ  χ t) such 
that relative investment  ˆ  I t increases 
but leaves the terms-of-trade (bond 
payments differential)  ˆ  q t unchanged. 
Such a combination of shocks will 
increase labor demand and labor 
incomes since investment spending 
is using more intensively local goods 
(a > 1/2).27 In the mean time, divi-
dends net of investment spending 
are falling. This generates negative 
comovements between labor income 
and dividends holding relative prices 
constant (or equivalently conditional 
on bond payments differentials).
The equity portfolio is the same as in 
Heathcote and Perri (2007)28 but holds for 
all values of the preference parameters. In 
their benchmark case, parameters are such 
that σ = ϕ = μ = 1. In that case, only fluc-
tuations in investment matters for the equity 
portfolio, for two reasons: (i) fluctuations in 
output are hedged through terms-of-trade 
movements (as in Cole and Obstfeld 1991) 
due to μ = 1; (ii) σ = 1 cancels out any 
real exchange rate hedging term. As a con-
sequence, the equity portfolio is the same 
as in the present model. In contrast to the 
 equities-only model, the equity portfolio in 
our model with bonds and equity is remark-
ably stable to changes in preference parame-
ters (see Coeurdacier and Gourinchas 2011).
The bond portfolio b is also the sum of two 
terms:
27 Note that with a = 1/2 , this term is equal to zero since 
increases in domestic investment changes do not increase 
more domestic demand than foreign. Wages increase as 
much in both countries.
28 They consider the same model but with equities and 
productivity shocks only.
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(i) The first term  1 _ 
2
(1 −  s I )(1 −  1 _ σ ) ( 2a − 1 ) 
is the hedging of real exchange rate 
risk. This is the desired exposure to 
real exchange rate in the absence of 
nontradable income risk  ( α → 1 ) . 
This term is unambiguously positive 
since local bonds have higher payoffs 
when local goods are more expensive.
(ii) The second term   ( 1 − α )  [ μ − 1 +  s I (2 a I − 1 ) 
2 ] 
  __ 
1 − (2a − 1)α 
 is the hedging of nontradable income 
risk conditionally on relative dividend 
payments: this term can be positive or 
negative. Roughly speaking, it is neg-
ative if relative wages are positively 
(resp. negatively) correlated with the 
terms-of-trade, which happens for 
low values of μ, i.e., low elasticity of 
substitution ϕ (resp. for high values 
of μ, i.e., high elasticity of substitu-
tion ϕ).
4.2.4 Empirical Evidence on the Hedging 
 of Nontradable Income Risk
In order to show the relevance of condi-
tioning for bond returns, we now present 
some empirical evidence on the hedging of 
nontradable risk (see Coeurdacier, Kollmann, 
and Martin 2010 for similar evidence29). The 
evidence is based on the expression of the 
portfolio in terms of variance/covariance 
ratio (equation 37)
We use national accounts data for G7 
countries to compute the conditional covari-
ance–variance ratio  ( Co v   q  ( ˆ w t  l t,  ˆ d t)/Va r   q  ( ˆ d t) ) 
for each country. Data are quarterly over 
the period 1980Q1–2008Q3. Data are taken 
from OECD National Accounts Data and 
from the IFS for exchange rates and price 
indices (see Coeurdacier and Gourinchas 
2011 for a precise description of the data). We 
compute relative labor income deviations 
29 In a revised version, Heathcote and Perri (2007) also 
provides similar empirical evidence.
 ˆ w t  l t  and relative dividend deviations  
ˆ
 d t for 
each country with respect to the other six 
countries (wages are computed for each 
country as the share of output going to labor 
and dividends are computed as the share of 
output going to capital net of investment 
spending).30 Deviations are either first-dif-
ference of the variables or HP-filtered data 
(smoothing parameter 1600). We compute 
bond payments differentials   q using the 
(trade-weighted) real exchange rate of one 
country with respect to the other six. Note 
that results are virtually the same when 
using nominal exchange rate instead of the 
real exchange rate (i.e., considering nominal 
bonds instead of real bonds). We also report 
the unconditional covariance–variance ratio ( Cov( ˆ w t  l t,  ˆ d t)/Var( ˆ d t) ) , the one that matter 
in an equity-only model (see equation 18). As 
shown in table 2, conditioning for exchange 
rate movements has a strong impact on the 
hedging properties of equities for nontrad-
able income risk: unconditionally (lines 1 
and 3), wages and dividends comove posi-
tively for all countries, which would lead to 
a large foreign equity bias in the equity-only 
model of section 4.1. Conditionally (lines 2 
and 4, wages and dividends comove nega-
tively for all countries, which lead to a home 
equity bias in our equity-bond model. The 
presence of bonds makes the international 
diversification puzzle better than you think, 
both in the model and in the data!
4.2.5 Related Literature
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) show, 
in a two-country, two-good, two-period 
endowment economy with trade in equities 
and bonds, how bond trading cast doubt on 
earlier findings of equities only models. They 
show that in many theoretical environments, 
30 We follow Gollin (2002) to allocate mixed-incomes 
from the national accounts to labor or capital. We assume 
that the share of mixed income going to labor is equal to 
the share of labor income in value added.
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bonds are an excellent hedge for real 
exchange rate fluctuations. They provide evi-
dence in line with table 2 based on returns 
data. Using data on G7 countries, they show 
that the unconditional correlation between 
returns on equity and returns on nontradable 
wealth is very different from the conditional 
one: while the former is positive for all coun-
tries (as in Baxter and Jermann 1997), the 
latter is negative (or nonsignificant) for all 
countries, rationalizing the degree of home 
bias observed in G7 countries. Their findings 
echo the empirical results of van Wincoop 
and Warnock (2010) who show that equities 
are a very poor hedge for real exchange risk, 
and even more so when trade in nominal 
bonds (currency forwards) is allowed.
A similar theoretical point is made in 
Engel and Matsumoto (2009a) in the spe-
cific case of a two-country/two-good DSGE 
model with monopolistic competition and 
sticky prices. Assets traded are domestic 
and foreign equity and positions in currency 
forward markets (which are equivalent to 
nominal bonds). Uncertainty is driven by pro-
ductivity shocks and money supply shocks. 
Due to price rigidity, nominal exchange rate 
fluctuations are related to real exchange rate 
fluctuations and the forward positions are 
used to hedge the nominal exchange rate 
changes, leaving only a part of the relative 
price risk to be hedged by equity positions. 
The authors show that sufficient degrees of 
price rigidity can generate substantial home 
bias in equity positions, as domestic returns 
to human wealth and domestic equity 
returns are negatively correlated, conditional 
on nominal exchange rate changes. With 
monopolistic competition and price rigidi-
ties, output is partly demand determined in 
the short run. Following a local positive pro-
ductivity shock, labor demand falls. Wages 
also fall, leading to a fall in domestic labor 
income. Mark-ups and profits increase, as, 
for the same level of production, labor costs 
go down. As price rigidities become smaller, 
we have two effects lowering home bias. 
Firstly, prices fall more following a posi-
tive productivity shock, increasing output 
and pushing up labor demand and wages. 
Secondly, the nominal and the real exchange 
rate become less closely related, making 
forward contracts less able to hedge fluctua-
tions in relative prices. In the extreme case 
TABLE 2 
The Hedging of Nontradable Risk: Conditional and Unconditional Covariance-Variance Ratios
CA FR GE IT JP UK US
(1) 
 Cov( 
ˆ
 w t  l t,  
ˆ
 dt)
 _
Var( ˆ dt)
  
0.16 0.28 0.32 0.58 0.42 0.49 0.37
(0.041) (0.064) (0.067) (0.065) (0.052) (0.057) (0.065)
(2)
 
Co v   q  ( 
ˆ
 w t  l t,  
ˆ
 dt)
 _
Va r   q  ( 
ˆ
 dt)
  
−0.015 −0.128 −0.095 −0.076 −0.080 −0.122 −0.051
(0.014) (0.015) (0.025) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026) (0.020)
(3)
 Cov( 
ˆ
 w t  l t,  
ˆ
 dt)
 _
Var( ˆ dt)
  
0.08 0.47 0.33 0.33 0.46 0.39 0.55
(0.035) (0.085) (0.073) (0.031) (0.045) (0.043) (0.075)
(4)
 
Co v   q  ( 
ˆ
 w t  l t,  
ˆ
 dt)
 _
Va r   q  ( 
ˆ
 dt)
  
−0.032 −0.139 −0.135 −0.011 −0.097 −0.084 −0.070
(0.009) (0.023) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
Notes: (1) and (2): in first-difference; (3) and (4): HP filter. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources: Authors’ computations. OECD National Accounts Statistics and International Financial Statistics.
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of full price flexibility, we go back to Baxter 
and Jermann (1997): labor incomes and prof-
its are perfectly correlated and investors do 
not take any forward position as they do not 
want any exposure to purely nominal risk. 
Engel and Matsumoto (2009b) generalize 
the results above to the cases of local bias 
in consumption, producer currency pricing, 
and wage rigidity.
Rabhari (2009) develops a two-country 
DSGE model with price stickiness, endog-
enous capital accumulation, trade in nominal 
bonds and equities, and endogenous mone-
tary policy. In his setting, equity home bias is 
again driven by the motive to hedge human 
capital risk. Real exchange rate risk is mainly 
hedged through bond positions due to price 
stickiness. He also shows that the combina-
tion of price stickiness and endogenous capi-
tal accumulation can produce relative equity 
returns that are unconditionally positively 
correlated with human capital returns, but 
conditionally negatively correlated (control-
ling for bond returns). This correlation pat-
tern is confirmed using U.S. data.
Devereux and Sutherland (2007, 2008) 
develop a two-country, two-good DSGE 
model with nominal rigidities à la Calvo, 
producer currency pricing, and endogenous 
monetary policy. The monetary authority 
sets the nominal interest rate in response to 
changes in producer price inflation. There 
is no local bias in consumption and produc-
tivity shocks are assumed to be persistent. 
The authors consider different asset market 
structures (portfolio autarky, trade in nomi-
nal bonds and trade in nominal bonds and 
equity). They can generate home bias in 
equities for the same reason as Engel and 
Matsumoto (2009a). They also find that 
monetary policy assumes an additional role 
in these models. By changing the returns on 
nominal bonds, monetary policy affects port-
folios and thus risk sharing. Interestingly, 
they find that while monetary policy has no 
impact on portfolios with trading in  nominal 
bonds and equities, in the case of bond trad-
ing only, there is an additional motive for 
price stability. With price stability, cross-
country nominal bonds returns differen-
tials become more correlated with the real 
exchange rate, which improves international 
risk sharing.
Lastly, Berriel and Bhattarai (2008) solve 
for equity and nominal bonds portfolios in 
a standard two-country general equilibrium 
model in presence of government spending 
shocks and nominal shocks (shocks to the 
price level): they investigate a new source 
of nontradable income risk, namely tax 
changes. In order to hedge fluctuations in 
taxes, households exhibit home bias toward 
local (government) nominal bonds and local 
equities. The main mechanism goes as fol-
lows: price level shocks at home (increase 
in home inflation) lowers the value of home 
government debt and the government can 
lower taxes (while still satisfying its intertem-
poral constraint). Hence, returns on domes-
tic nominal bonds and local taxes comove 
positively and the household prefers to hold 
local nominal bonds. Government spending 
shocks lead to an increase in taxes. In the 
meantime, as government expenditures are 
biased toward local goods, the relative price 
of locally produced goods increase and so 
does the pay-off of the claim to local output 
(local equity). Hence, returns on local equity 
and taxes comove positively and households 
will optimally bias their portfolio toward 
local equity.
4.3 Extensions and Shortcomings
4.3.1 Other Assets?
The recent literature has shown the 
importance of extending existing models to 
a larger menu of assets. Due to substitution 
across asset classes, the hedging role of an 
asset is modified by the presence of other 
available types of assets. Thus, an important 
issue is why we should restrict our attention 
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to bonds and equities instead of considering 
an even larger set of assets. There is no sim-
ple answer to this question: potentially any 
asset that is traded publicly could affect the 
equity portfolio if it has some hedging prop-
erties in addition to what bonds and equities 
can achieve. Note that the empirical tests 
of these hedging properties based on cova-
riance-variance ratios could be potentially 
extended to a larger menu of assets, one just 
needs to condition for returns on these other 
assets. In particular, including housing as an 
additional asset seems a natural extension of 
existing work.
A related question is the role of corpo-
rate debt in these models. We have ignored 
debt as a way to raise capital for firms and 
have focused on firms that are fully financed 
through equity. Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and 
Martin (2010) tackle this issue by allowing 
for an exogenous financial structure of firms 
in a world of “locally complete” markets. 
They show that, in an environment where the 
financial structure is irrelevant for the value 
of the firm (when the Modigliani–Miller 
theorem applies), the presence of corporate 
debt has no impact on investment decisions 
and the equilibrium consumption alloca-
tion (up to the first order) since markets are 
complete. Moreover, the equilibrium equity 
portfolio is also not affected by the presence 
of corporate debt. They show that domestic 
investors will hold a fraction of the corporate 
debt issued by domestic firms that is equal to 
the fraction of stocks of the same firms that 
they hold. Hence, if the model delivers home 
bias in equity, it will also deliver home bias 
in corporate debt in the same proportion. 
The reason is simple: when the Modigliani–
Miller theorem applies, investors want a cer-
tain exposure to the total value of the firm, 
which is independent of its financial struc-
ture. In particular, the fraction of the value of 
the firm they hold optimally is pinned down 
in the case where firms are fully financed 
through equity. When firms are partially 
financed through debt, holding the same 
fraction of debt and equity guarantees that 
investors have their optimal exposure to the 
value of the firm. One shortcoming though 
is that such a result might not hold if the 
Modigliani–Miller theorem does not apply 
or if financial markets are incomplete. We 
are not aware of any models that pins down 
international portfolios in a world where the 
financial structure of firm, optimal or not, 
affects the value of the firm and matters for 
the real allocation.
4.3.2 Exchange Rates and Asset Prices
While the models described above can 
claim some success in replicating some fea-
tures of aggregate portfolio data, they cannot 
replicate realistic moments of asset prices 
and exchange rates (see Lewis 2011 for a 
recent survey on international asset pric-
ing puzzles). They do not solve the standard 
puzzles in the finance literature regarding 
the equity premium and the volatility of asset 
prices and exchange rates. This is an impor-
tant limitation since portfolios should be the 
mirror of asset prices as both are determined 
in equilibrium. This does not mean that the 
mechanisms highlighted would not survive in 
more general environments able to generate 
realistic asset prices but this remains to be 
seen. First attempts in that direction include 
Stathopoulos (2008, 2011) who introduces 
habit formation and Benigno and Nistico 
(2009) who model ambiguity aversion. 
Interestingly, Benigno and Nistico (2009) 
show that, taking into account long run con-
sumption risk, which is correlated with the 
real exchange rate, changes the properties 
of the pricing kernel and rationalizes home 
bias. We believe that explaining asset prices 
moments should help disentangling across 
the different potential channels generating 
portfolio biases.
An important related shortcoming of this 
class of models with endogenous portfolio 
decisions is that the allocation under perfect 
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risk-sharing is replicated, or at least up to the 
degree of the approximation. This implies an 
equality between the ratio of marginal utili-
ties of consumption and the real exchange 
rate in all states of nature. With standard 
CRRA preferences, this leads to a perfect 
correlation between real exchange rate 
changes and relative consumption growth 
(Home relative consumption falls when 
Home relative prices are higher; see equa-
tion 14 in the previous models). In the data, 
this is strongly rejected, the correlation is 
close to zero and if anything Home relative 
consumption increases when Home relative 
prices are higher: this is the famous consump-
tion-real exchange rate anomaly (Kollmann–
Backus–Smith puzzle; see Backus and Smith 
1993 and Kollmann 1995). In the previous 
models, the asset structure and the dimen-
sion of uncertainty are such that one can 
replicate the efficient allocation (up to first 
order). One could believe that adding addi-
tional sources of uncertainty such that mar-
kets are incomplete even locally would help 
to solve the consumption-real exchange rate 
anomaly. It turns out to be extremely hard 
to lower the correlation between relative 
consumption and the real exchange rate in 
models with endogenous portfolio decisions 
despite imperfect spanning of risks (see 
Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin 2008 
and Benigno and Küçük-Tu ˘    ger 2008). In 
most existing models with endogenous port-
folio choice, international risk-sharing is still 
far above what consumption data suggests 
and this remains an important challenge for 
future work.
4.3.3 Dispersion of Home Bias across Time, 
 Countries, and Assets
Data on home bias exhibit substantial vari-
ations across time and across countries (see 
figures 1 and 2 and table 1). Most of the work 
has been dedicated to match the average 
degree of home bias observed in developed 
countries (Collard et al. 2007 and Heathcote 
and Perri 2007 are notable exceptions: in 
line with model predictions, they match the 
degree of equity bias to the degree of trade 
openness of countries). Since more data on 
aggregate foreign asset holdings are now avail-
able, both in the time series and in the cross-
section, it seems natural to extend theories to 
heterogeneous countries. This would provide 
more accurate tests of the different theories 
available. Exploiting the bilateral dimension 
of the data using a multicountry framework 
could also help in that matter. Indeed, using 
the CPIS data provided by the IMF since 
2001, one can now observe equity holdings 
between country pairs. Most of the theoreti-
cal literature has so far limited its attention to 
models with two symmetric countries, which 
does not allow to exploit the bilateral and 
cross-sectional variations of the data.
A similar point can be made regarding 
the currency exposure of international port-
folios. As shown by Lane and Shambaugh 
(2010a, 2010b), the currency denomina-
tion of foreign assets and liabilities are very 
heterogeneous across countries. While, 
on average, the advanced countries are (in 
net terms) borrowing in foreign-currency, 
some major countries have very large nega-
tive domestic-currency debt positions (most 
notably the United States). Models includ-
ing bond positions denominated in differ-
ent currencies should be also tested against 
such data. In section 7, we also provide some 
evidence on the cross-sectional dispersion of 
home bias for other asset classes (bonds and 
banking assets).
5. Asset Trade Costs in International 
Financial Markets
So far, we have focused on hedging 
motives as a source of heterogeneity in port-
folios assuming frictionless financial markets. 
Another strand of the macroeconomics liter-
ature considers frictions in financial markets 
as the main source of heterogeneity across 
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investors. Portfolio home bias is the natural 
outcome of these frictions. Such frictions 
could include fixed or proportional transac-
tion costs in foreign portfolio investments, 
difference of tax treatments across domes-
tic and foreign portfolio incomes and other 
policy induced restrictions on foreign invest-
ments (such as limits to foreign investment, 
capital controls, differences in legal frame-
works) (see French and Poterba 1991, Lewis 
1999, and Dahlquist et al. 2003). Other 
important frictions to international invest-
ments are informational frictions. The role of 
information has been extensively investigated 
in the finance literature but less so in the 
Open Financial Macroeconomics literature 
(Hatchondo 2008; Tille and van Wincoop 
2009; and Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela 
2011 are recent notable exceptions). For this 
reason, we will review the literature on infor-
mational frictions (and behavioral biases) in 
a separate section (see section 6).
5.1 Transaction Costs Would Need to Be Very 
Large to Explain Equity Home Bias . . .
There is a wide debate on the importance of 
transaction costs to explain international port-
folio decisions. French and Poterba (1991) 
initially argue in a mean-variance framework 
that these costs must be much larger than the 
one typically observed if one wants to rational-
ize equity home bias. Using stock returns data 
from 1975 to 1989 for the United States, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Canada, the authors use estimates of a covari-
ance matrix of returns together with an opti-
mal portfolio rule that is implied by constant 
relative risk aversion in order to back out the 
differences in expected returns needed to 
explain actual portfolio shares for these coun-
tries. The implicit excess return on domestic 
equity implied by observed portfolio holdings 
is then interpreted as a measure of the cost 
of international asset trading needed to gen-
erate the observed home bias: they find an 
order of magnitude for these costs of several 
hundred basis points, too big to be true! 
Numerous subsequent studies have provided 
such indirect estimates of the costs. Jeske 
(2001) calculates the implicit costs on foreign 
assets necessary to skew the portfolio alloca-
tion away from the optimal (based on a mean 
variance model) toward the observed alloca-
tion. These costs are very large ranging from 
150 to 700 basis points across countries. Most 
studies are in line with French and Poterba’s 
(1991) results and argue that costs need to be 
very large to explain portfolio holdings (see 
Cooper and Kaplanis 1994, among others). A 
notable exception is Sercu and Vanpée (2008) 
who find that, once they control for many fac-
tors (currency risk, inflation hedging, fixed-
interest investments, round-tripping, and 
omitted countries) and allow for time varying 
covariances, the implicit inward investment 
costs are much lower than in earlier studies 
in developed markets (in the order of magni-
tude of 0.10–0.20 percent per annum). It is 
however important to note that the associated 
costs estimated from stock returns data suffer 
from potential statistical uncertainty: due to 
the high volatility of stock returns, estimates 
of expected returns based on past data are 
imprecise. Hence, when testing whether opti-
mal portfolios weights are statistically differ-
ent from the observed ones, results have been 
quite inconclusive (see Bekaert and Urias 
1996, Gorman and Jorgensen 2002, Britten-
Jones 1999, and Lewis 1999, among others). 
In other words, estimated costs to rationalize 
portfolio allocations have large standard errors 
and in many cases one cannot reject that the 
observed home biased portfolio allocation is not 
statistically different from the optimal one.31
31 Pástor (2000) goes one step ahead and exam-
ines whether an investor that updates his views on the 
 distribution of domestic and foreign returns in a Bayesian 
fashion may choose a strongly home biased portfolio. This 
will be true if the investor holds a strong biased prior 
toward the domestic asset. But greater uncertainty on for-
eign stock returns can induce him to pay more attention to 
the data and move away from this prior.
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Another piece of evidence pointing that 
transaction costs cannot rationalize portfolio 
holdings is Tesar and Werner (1995): trans-
action costs based explanation of the equity 
home bias should in general imply that 
turnover should be lower for foreign equity 
holdings than for domestic ones (unless they 
apply only to dividend repatriation). Tesar 
and Werner (1995) find that turnover is in 
fact higher for foreign holdings.32
5.2  . . . Unless Diversification Benefits Are 
Very Small
As stated above, transaction costs are often 
assumed to be small although direct mea-
sures of these costs do not often exist (see 
below). However, as shown by Martin and 
Rey (2004) and Coeurdacier and Guibaud 
(2009), even small transaction costs may 
lead to sizable home bias when Home and 
Foreign stocks are close substitutes: any 
small transaction cost is amplified if the ben-
efits of diversification provided by foreign 
assets are small.
Indeed, small diversification benefits is a 
crucial ingredient for the transaction costs 
based story to work. A key contribution in 
this literature is Cole and Obstfeld (1991), 
who show in the context of a two country/two 
good model that gains from international risk 
sharing are probably quite small, as changes 
in the terms of trade help to share risk inter-
nationally even with portfolio autarky. The 
intuition is simple. Assuming Cobb–Douglas 
preferences over the consumption of the two 
good, an increase in local output triggers 
an equivalent fall in their relative prices as 
local goods are now more abundant (terms-
of-trade adjustment). In this economy port-
folio autarky implies perfect correlation of 
32  Rowland (1999) and Amadi and Bergin (2008) con-
struct models that can generate higher turnover for foreign 
asset holdings than for domestic ones, in the former case 
with proportional trading costs, while the latter use fixed 
trading costs.
marginal utilities—the complete market out-
come. It is worth noting, however, that this 
argument implies that a portfolio would be 
indeterminate if trade in equities were pos-
sible since home and foreign stocks would be 
perfect substitutes. Cole and Obstfeld (1991) 
show that the equivalence between portfolio 
autarky and complete markets also obtains in 
a setting with investment under the follow-
ing assumptions: (i) unitary elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two goods, (ii) unitary 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and 
(iii) full depreciation. For the no-investment 
case, the authors calculate welfare gains of 
moving from autarky to perfect international 
risk-sharing. They find small welfare gains 
for a broad range of values of the elasticity 
of substitution between the two goods. Since 
the seminal paper of Cole and Obstfeld 
(1991), a large number of papers using con-
sumption data have computed welfare gains 
from international risk sharing with quite a 
lot of variation across studies. Van Wincoop 
(1999) documents the extent to which the 
results are strongly sensitive to assumptions 
about preferences (the coefficient of relative 
risk-aversion and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between traded and nontraded goods), 
the assumed “autarky” consumption pro-
cess, the implicitly chosen risk-free interest 
rate and the horizon of calculations. Without 
closing the debate, he tries to narrow the 
range of reasonable estimates and does find 
significant gains from risk sharing among 
OECD countries over a long horizon: 1.1 to 
3.5 percent of permanent consumption for a 
fifty-year horizon, and 2.5 to 7.5 percent for 
a one-hundred-year horizon.
Overall though, explicit consumption 
based calculations of the welfare cost of 
underdiversification tend to imply low costs. 
These results are very often driven by the 
low variability of consumption in the data. 
In contrast, costs of underdiversification 
based on stock returns data are usually much 
larger, due to the much larger volatility of 
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stock returns. This point is clearly made by 
Lewis (2000): she finds that moving from 
portfolio equity autarky toward an optimally 
diversified portfolio (efficient frontier in a 
mean-variance framework with a relative 
risk aversion of 2 leads to a gain of 10 to 
30 percent of current wealth while moving 
from autarky consumption to perfect inter-
national risk-sharing leads to an increase 
in permanent consumption of less than 1 
percent. The gap between the two metrics 
remains an open question; one will need to 
reconcile risk-sharing gains using consump-
tion and asset prices data to fully evaluate the 
impact of transaction costs on international 
portfolios.
Finally, another argument in the litera-
ture has been that domestic multinationals 
already provide benefits of diversification 
by being active in many countries, reduc-
ing the gains from international diversifica-
tion. However, Lewis (1999) and Rowland 
and Tesar (2004) argue that the correlation 
between the returns of multinational and 
their national stock indices is quite high, thus 
limiting the diversification benefits they can 
actually offer.
5.3 Direct Measures of the Costs?
It is important to note that most existing 
work provides indirect measures of trans-
action costs using stock returns data and 
observed portfolio allocation (as in French 
and Poterba 1991). There are no papers we 
are aware of that presents an extensive mea-
sure of actual costs in investing in foreign 
assets. While directly observed transaction 
costs on the stock markets are typically very 
low, they might not be the appropriate mea-
sure for these asset trade costs. For instance, 
most households go through financial inter-
mediaries to invest in stock markets (pension 
funds, mutual funds . . . ) but there is so far 
very little empirical evidence investigating 
the difference in fees collected for foreign 
investments compared to domestic ones.
The question of the role of international 
taxation also remains opened. For simplicity, 
we abstract from taxation issues within mul-
tinationals and the effects on international 
taxation on Foreign Direct Investment and 
focus on the taxation of portfolio incomes. 
When considering the rules of international 
taxation, one could expect some large impact 
on home portfolio biases. First, dividends 
when repatriated are subject to non-negli-
gible withholding taxes (of a magnitude of 
roughly 10 percent in developed countries). 
Even if many bilateral tax treaties lead to 
some exemptions of these withholding taxes 
(through tax credits schemes), this is not true 
for all investors and these exemptions are 
often subject to some ceilings. Second, most 
developed countries have dividend imputa-
tion schemes: capital incomes (profits) are 
indeed taxed twice in most countries, at the 
corporate tax level and at the income tax level 
(when profits are distributed to sharehold-
ers). To avoid this double-taxation, share-
holders receive a tax rebate. The tax rebate 
is such that, on net, investors end up paying 
the income tax only. Such dividend imputa-
tion schemes do not apply to foreign asset 
holdings. This drives an additional significant 
differential in the taxation of capital incomes 
coming from domestic or foreign firms (see 
Gordon and Hines 2002 and chapter 10 
of the Griffith, Hines, and Sørensen 2010 
for excellent surveys). However, as argued 
by Gordon and Hines (2002), these tax dif-
ferentials might not be effective in practice 
since this is very difficult for governments to 
enforce the taxation on foreign asset incomes. 
Tax evasion on income from foreign securi-
ties through foreign financial intermediar-
ies (in tax havens in particular) might be an 
issue if one wants to measure exactly the 
costs associated to international taxation. 
Hence, while most papers tend to argue that 
taxation  differentials between domestic and 
foreign asset incomes cannot fully account 
for the size of portfolio biases, it remains very 
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hard to provide a quantitative estimate of 
their impact on portfolio decisions. Studying 
optimal taxation of capital in a model where 
home bias is endogenous would be a very nat-
ural extension of the literature. Gordon and 
Gaspar (2001) provide an interesting treat-
ment of optimal tax policies in a partial equi-
librium model where home bias in equity or 
bonds is endogenously generated.
6. Informational Frictions and 
Behavioral Biases
6.1 Informational Frictions
6.1.1 Exogenous Information Sets
The impact of informational asymmetries 
on portfolio decisions has been first studied 
in the finance literature.33 In this literature, 
domestic and foreign investors differ on 
their (exogenously given) information sets 
regarding future domestic and foreign stock 
returns. Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao 
(1997) develop a simple two country noisy 
rational expectations model with one stock 
per country. They assume that agents in each 
country receive a signal on the future per-
formance of each stock but the signal on the 
foreign asset is less precise. Hence, domestic 
investors perceive the foreign stock as risk-
ier and reduce their foreign stock holdings, 
which leads to equity home bias. Moreover, 
Brennan and Cao (1997) show that less well 
informed foreign investors respond more 
strongly to public signals on domestic stocks 
conveyed by stock prices. Hence, foreign 
investors buy more of the domestic stocks 
when the domestic market performs well. 
The authors find evidence for this “return 
33 Contrary to the standard DSGE macro models, the 
finance literature described here relies on some partial 
equilibrium assumptions: stock returns characteristics (risk 
and expected returns) are exogenously given and the risk-
free asset is in infinite supply.
chasing” effect in the data. Brennan et al. 
(2005) extend their initial work by developing 
a noisy expectations model where investors 
receive public and private information sig-
nals. The private signal is less precise for for-
eign investors. The authors show that there 
is a link between information disadvantages 
and the expectations (degree of bullishness) 
about a market: foreign investors tend to 
become more bullish about a certain market 
following a positive return on that market. 
Glassman and Riddick (2001) quantify what 
should be the perceived riskiness of foreign 
assets (due to lower information quality) in 
order to generate the observed home bias 
of U.S. investors. They find that investors 
would have to scale up standard deviations of 
returns by a factor from 2 to 5 depending on 
risk aversion and conclude that these scaling 
factors are implausibly high. Albuquerque, 
Bauer, and Schneider (2007) solve for inter-
national equity flows when a set of home and 
foreign investors have superior information. 
They argue that this informational hetero-
geneity within the foreign set of investors is 
more important than informational hetero-
geneity across countries to explain interna-
tional equity trades. In line with the data, the 
model explains why (i) U.S. investors trade in 
waves, with simultaneous buying and selling; 
(ii) U.S. investors change their foreign equity 
positions gradually; and (iii) U.S. investors 
increase their equity position in a country 
following a raise in its stock price.
The finance literature described above 
had a recent impact on more standard 
general equilibrium macro models along 
the lines of the Open Economy Financial 
Macroeconomics approach. Hatchondo 
(2008) builds a single good two country 
model and two assets per country with two 
departures from standard models. Firstly, 
he assumes that only local investors receive 
informative signals about local assets. This 
informational advantage induces agents 
to invest in the good local asset. Secondly, 
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engaging in short selling is assumed to be 
costly. When the signal is sufficiently infor-
mative and short selling costs are high 
enough, agents do not sell the bad local asset 
short in order to invest more in the good 
local asset but rather reduce their holdings 
of foreign assets. This leads to equity home 
bias in equilibrium. Gordon and Bovenberg 
(1996), present a small open economy model 
where home bias results from information 
asymmetries, which decrease the return 
home investors get on their foreign capital 
investment. In such a set up, subsidizing 
capital imports is optimal. Razin, Sadka, and 
Yuen (1999) assume that domestic inves-
tors can observe the productivity of domes-
tic firms before making their loan decisions, 
while foreign investors cannot. This results 
in foreign underinvestment and domestic 
oversaving. Building on a similar asymmetric 
information set up but adding the possibil-
ity of liquidity shocks, Goldstein and Razin 
(2006) study the trade-off between FDI and 
portfolio investment, the latter being more 
liquid than the former.
Tille and van Wincoop (2009) apply the 
noisy rational expectations framework from 
the finance literature to a standard two-coun-
try/one-good DSGE model. They depart 
from standard open macro models by intro-
ducing information dispersion across inves-
tors. Each investor receives a private signal 
on the future fundamentals (productivity) of 
domestic and foreign stock, the signal on its 
own stock being more precise (as in Gehrig 
1993 and Brennan and Cao 1997). The noise 
is introduced in the form of (unobserved) 
stochastic transaction costs to invest abroad 
which generates portfolio shifts toward or 
away from foreign assets. This makes sure 
that stock prices cannot fully aggregate pri-
vate signals in equilibrium. These trans-
action costs generate equity home bias in 
equilibrium but this is not the purpose of 
the paper. They show that dispersed private 
information disconnects stock prices from 
the currently observed fundamental values 
but also international capital flows (gross 
and net). Moreover, capital flows should 
help forecast future fundamentals. They find 
some empirical support for their results.
6.1.2 Endogenous Information Acquisition
The early noisy rational expectations lit-
erature when applied to international port-
folio choice relies on exogenous information 
structures. A recent challenge has been to 
extend it by allowing for endogenous infor-
mation acquisition. In this line of research, 
information is a tool to reduce the condi-
tional variance of the asset payoffs. Using 
a model of rational inattention introduced 
by Sims (2003), Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp (2009) build a model where a tiny 
information advantage is enough to gener-
ate significant home bias if investors have a 
limited capacity to process information. In 
this model, agents are endowed with a small 
informational advantage on the local asset, 
which lowers its perceived riskiness. Thus, 
the investor will tend to hold more of the local 
asset. However, this effect is amplified as the 
more of an asset the agent owns, the more 
attractive it becomes to learn about the asset. 
Endogenous and costly acquisition of infor-
mation amplifies the initial small informa-
tional advantage and leads to specialization 
in local stocks. Learning turns out to amplify 
information asymmetries instead of reducing 
them. In their set up, countries which are 
learnt about a lot by investors should have 
lower returns compared to the prediction 
of a standard CAPM model, as lower uncer-
tainty goes hand in hand with a lower return. 
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) 
apply variations of their rational inatten-
tion model to explain investment strategies 
of investors, varying the specification of the 
preferences or of the information constraint 
that they face. Depending on the convexity 
of the objective function of investors, they 
can rationalize concentrated or diversified 
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portfolios. Mondria (2010) allows rationally 
inattentive investors to decide not only on 
the precision but also on the structure of 
the information they process. In equilib-
rium, agents choose to learn not only about 
individual assets but also about linear com-
bination of assets, i.e., indices. Such a learn-
ing strategy makes sense as the structure of 
the signal the agents choose in equilibrium 
depends on their objective function. Since 
investors will choose to hold a somewhat 
diversified portfolio in equilibrium, they 
choose to process information about combi-
nations of assets (they are interested not only 
in the volatility of each asset but also in their 
covariance). Mondria and Wu (2010) use a 
similar framework to explain the time series 
of home bias. When financial liberalization 
takes place in the developed economies in 
the 1980s, investors start to be able to diver-
sify their portfolios and home bias decreases 
but only gradually as investors have an initial 
information advantage on domestic assets. 
The authors show that persistence of asset 
pay-offs and increases in information pro-
cessing capacity tends to magnify home bias. 
By looking at the interaction of capital open-
ness and learning strategies, they are able to 
reproduce the time series of home bias.34
6.1.3 Empirical Evidence on Informational 
 Frictions
A number of papers regress portfolio hold-
ings or measures of home bias directly on 
factors that proxy for information asymme-
tries. Portes and Rey (2005) show that physi-
cal distance affects international equity flows 
and holdings very significantly: doubling the 
distance reduces cross-border equity flows 
by half. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that 
U.S. mutual fund managers prefer to invest in 
nearby firms even within a country. Ahearne, 
Griever, and Warnock (2004) find that U.S. 
34 For a very nice exposition of the applications of ratio-
nal inattention to invesment choice, see Veldkamp (2011).
holdings of foreign equities are significantly 
biased toward countries that have a higher 
share of their stock market listed on U.S. 
stock exchanges. Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) 
find that stock market development and 
familiarity variables have a significant impact 
on home bias for a sample of mutual funds 
spanning twenty-six developed and develop-
ing markets. They aggregate the investments 
of these funds at the country level. Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2001) emphasize the key role 
of distance, language, and cultural similari-
ties in international asset allocation. Aviat and 
Coeurdacier (2007) revisit the impact of dis-
tance on cross-border equity holdings (and 
bank loans). They find that the impact of dis-
tance is drastically reduced once we control 
for bilateral goods trade: countries’ portfolios 
are strongly biased toward trading partners 
(see also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008). 
Using instrumental variables, they show that 
the causality goes essentially one-way: reduc-
ing barriers to trade in goods enhances cross-
border asset holdings. However, one cannot 
reject the role of goods trade in fostering 
information flows across borders. Since a lot 
of information on stocks come through the 
accounts of firms, it is to be expected that 
different accounting standards would act as 
information barriers. Bradshaw, Bushee, and 
Miller (2004) find that firms exhibiting higher 
levels (changes) of U.S. GAAP conformity 
have greater levels (changes) of U.S. institu-
tional ownership. This positive relation holds 
regardless of a firm’s visibility to U.S. investors 
(e.g., American Depositary Receipt listing, 
stock index membership, analyst following, 
firm size). Finally, using survey data on Italian 
investors, Guiso and Jappelli (2006) find that 
investors who spend more time to acquire 
information also tend to hold less diversified 
portfolios as implied by models of endoge-
nous information acquisition.
Most models of information asymmetries 
though also imply that domestic investors 
should earn a higher return than foreign 
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investors. However, the empirical evidence 
on this matter is mixed. Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999), Hau (2001), Dvorak (2005), and 
Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) find that domes-
tic investors do in fact earn higher returns, 
while Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and 
Huang and Shiu (2006) find the opposite.
6.2 Behavioral Biases
Some recent papers have put forward a 
behavioral explanation for the equity home 
bias. Using departures from rational expec-
tations and maximization of standard von 
Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions 
used in standard macro literature, this lit-
erature has highlighted some behavioral 
biases consistent with the data on inter-
national portfolio allocation. The seminal 
paper of French and Poterba (1991) already 
considers overconfidence toward local 
assets as a potential explanation: if inves-
tors systematically have higher expectations 
of relative returns for domestic equities, 
this difference in expected returns, while 
inconsistent, can overturn any perceived 
diversification gains. In the same vein, 
Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1991) docu-
ment large differences in expected returns 
of Japanese and U.S. investors for the same 
stock markets. They find that Japanese 
investors tend to expect relatively higher 
returns for Japanese stocks, while U.S. 
investors expect higher returns on U.S. 
equity. A similar argument can be applied 
to estimated variances (either the standard 
deviation of domestic equity is systemati-
cally believed to be lower or correlations 
with foreign equities are overestimated). 
Studies by Gur Huberman (2001), Benartzi 
(2001), and Karlsson and Norden (2007) 
(see also Barberis and Thaler 2003 for a sur-
vey) suggest that “familiarity” might be the 
main determinant of portfolio choice: inves-
tors choose “familiar” assets while ignoring 
the principles of portfolio theory. Graham, 
Harvey, and Huang (2009) investigate the 
role of self-assessed trading competences 
on portfolio home bias. They show how 
home bias can emerge when investor feels 
incompetent in understanding the benefits 
and the risks of investing in foreign assets. 
However, it remains difficult to disentangle 
empirically informational frictions linked 
to distance and/or institutional differences 
from behavioral biases such as “familiarity” 
and/or “competence” effects. Solnik (2006) 
explains the equity home bias by the Regret 
Theory: investors use the domestic portfo-
lio as a benchmark and feel the pain when 
their foreign investments underperform. 
Morse and Shive (2011) find that home bias 
is empirically related to measures of patrio-
tism. Amonlirdviman and Carvalho (2010) 
study the effect of loss aversion or home bias.
To our knowledge, building on Dumas, 
Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Dumas, Lewis, 
and Osambela (2011) are the first ones to 
develop a standard two-country general 
equilibrium model (in continuous time) 
where investors exhibit behavioral biases 
in the form of differences in their beliefs. 
Investors have access to the same informa-
tion set (no asymmetric information) but 
differ in their beliefs about the information 
contained in economic public signals: local 
investors trust more the information con-
tained in local signals and incorrectly believe 
that the information in the foreign signal is 
partly noise. These asymmetric beliefs help 
the authors to solve for some anomalies at 
the international level: investors exhibit 
home equity bias, asset prices are the combi-
nation of a local CAPM and an international 
CAPM (in line with the empirical evidence 
of Bekaert and Harvey 1995) and as in mod-
els of asymmetric information (see Brennan 
et al. 2005), capital flows toward a country 
covary positively with returns in that coun-
try. Their model with differences in beliefs is 
indeed observationally equivalent to existing 
models of segmented markets due to asym-
metric information.
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7. New Portfolio Facts
7.1 Aggregate Data on Portfolio Holdings
The Open Economy Financial Macro-
economics models have implications for 
international bond holdings as well as inter-
national equity holdings. Hence, we provide 
some measure of the extent of risk-sharing 
through international bonds holdings (pub-
lic and private) for a large cross section of 
countries by using data on cross-border bond 
holdings. For completeness we also present 
some data on international bank lending, as 
we expect that the Open Economy Financial 
Macroeconomics will soon incorporate for-
mally bank intermediation in their models. 
For these data, we rely on CPIS and IFS 
data from the IMF and the data from the 
BIS (see appendix for a detailed description 
of the data).
7.1.1 Cross-Border Bond Holdings
We use data from IFS and BIS to compute 
international bond holdings for selected 
countries. Unfortunately, available data do 
not allow to disaggregate data of foreign 
bond holdings across types of bonds (corpo-
rate versus public, across maturities, across 
currency denomination)35 and we had to 
focus on bond holdings aggregates.
To measure the degree of international 
diversification of bond portfolios, we com-
pute a measure of home bias in bond hold-
ings similar to the one we computed for 
equity holdings. Hence, our measure of 
Bond Home Bias for country i (BH B i ) is 
defined as follows:
(43) BH B i = 1
−  Share of Foreign Bonds in Country i Bond Holdings   ___  
Share of Foreign Bonds in the World Bond Market Portfolio
 .
35 For more details on the currency denomination of 
foreign assets and liabilities, see Lane and Shambaugh 
(2010a, 2010b).
In figure 3, we show the evolution of bond 
home bias measures in developed countries 
across regions of the world: it has decreased 
over the last twenty years with the process 
of “financial globalization” but remains still 
very high in all countries. Portfolios exhibit 
a home bias in bond holdings of a slightly 
larger magnitude than the one documented 
for equity in section 2. On average, the 
degree of home bias across the world is 0.75 
(just like for equities it is lower in Europe 
where monetary union seemed to have had 
an effect but higher in other countries),36 
meaning that the share of foreign bonds 
in investors portfolios is roughly a quarter 
of what investors would hold if they were 
holding the world bond market portfolio. 
Despite a large degree of home bias, these 
data indicates that some international risk-
sharing occurs through bond holdings and it 
seems necessary to incorporate cross-border 
bond holdings in the theoretical portfolios 
model we are using. In figure 4, we show 
the degree of bond home bias for emerging 
markets: emerging markets have even much 
less diversified bond portfolios than devel-
oped countries and it has barely decreased 
over the last decade. Like for equities, there 
is a significant dispersion of bond home bias 
across countries (and across time) that could 
be helpful to guide future theoretical work.
7.1.2 Cross-Border Bank Loans
We use data from the BIS and the OECD 
to compute cross-border banking assets for 
selected countries. Like for bonds, available 
data do not allow to disaggregate data of for-
eign bank loans across types of loans and we 
had to focus on aggregate foreign asset hold-
ings by banks.
To measure the degree of international di-
versification of banks’ portfolios, we compute 
36 See Lane (2006), Coeurdacier and Martin (2009), and 
Fidora, Fratzscher, and Thimann (2007) for studies on the 
impact of the euro on cross-border bond diversification.
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a measure of home bias in bank loans com-
parable to the one used for equities and 
bonds. Hence, our measure of Home Bias 
in Loans for country i (LH B i ) is defined as 
follows:
(44) LH B i = 1 
−  Share of Foreign Banking Assets in Country i Banking Assets    ___  
Foreign Banking Assets as a share of Total Foreign Outstanding Loans
 .
In figure 5, we show the evolution of home 
bias in bank loans measures across OECD 
countries using OECD data. Figure 6 shows 
the same statistic but using BIS statistics 
(available for a larger number of countries 
but over a shorter time period; see appendix 
for a detailed description of the data). 
Despite an increased diversification, bank-
ing portfolios still exhibit a very strong home 
bias. The magnitude of the home bias in 
banking assets is similar to the one observed 
for equity holdings. Like for equities and 
bonds, the degree of Home Bias is the small-
est in Europe (potentially due to the EMU) 
and the largest in emerging markets (here 
Latin America).
7.2 Institutional Investors Home Bias Data
An increasing share of capital flows are 
intermediated through institutional inves-
tors. For example, using the Survey of 
Consumer Finance, Polkovnichenko (2005) 
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Figure 3. Measures of Home Bias in Bonds across Developed Countries
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documents that, in 2001, 62 percent of all 
equity holdings by U.S. households were 
indirect holdings. Information asymmetries 
explanations of the home bias seem more 
plausible for households than for fund man-
agers, who can devote a substantial amount 
of resources to gather relevant information. 
Also, if home bias can be explained by the 
degree of sophistication of investors regard-
ing their investment strategies, one would 
expect that professional investors would 
be fully aware of the theoretical benefits of 
diversification. Furthermore, with delegated 
investment comes an agency problem and 
the incentives of the final investor and of 
the fund manager are not necessarily well 
aligned. It should therefore be informative 
to look at portfolio allocations at the fund 
level to understand better the determinants 
of home bias. Hau and Rey (2008) provides 
some descriptive statistics on domestic and 
foreign holdings of mutual funds in four 
countries. We use the same data set—data 
of global equity holdings from Thomson 
Financial Securities (TFS)—to estimate 
home bias at the fund level on a larger cross 
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1999         2000             2001          2002             2003           2004           2005            2006           2007           2008
Developed countries
Central and Eastern Europe
South Africa
Emerging Asia
Central and South America
Figure 4. Measures of Home Bias in Bonds across Emerging Countries
Note: The country measure BHBi is market capitalization-weighted for each region. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. Bank for International Settlements and International Financial Statistics. 
Countries: Developed (Japan, Australia, Austria, Belgium Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Canada and 
United States); Central and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru); South Africa; 
Central and Eastern Europe (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic); Emerging Asia 
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section of countries. The data document 
individual mutual funds holdings at the stock 
level. TFS was created by the merger of The 
Investext Group, Security Data Company 
and CDA/Spectrum. The data cover the 
five-year period 1997 to 2002 and has an 
interesting cross-sectional and time series 
dimension.37 The TFS holding data comprise 
fund number, fund name, management com-
pany name, country code of the fund incor-
poration, stock identifier, country code of the 
stock, stock position (number of stocks held), 
37 Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) used a similar dataset—
albeit only for one year. They aggregate the data across all 
funds to document home bias at the country level.
reporting dates for which holding data is 
available, security price on the reporting date 
and the security price on the closest previous 
days in case the reporting date had no price 
information on the security, total return index 
(including dividend reinvestments) in local 
currency, and daily dollar exchange rates 
for all investment destinations. Most funds 
report only with a frequency of six months. 
Reporting dates differ somewhat, but more 
than 90 percent of the reporting occurs in 
the last thirty days of each half-year. A limi-
tation of the data is that they do not include 
any information on cash holdings, financial 
leverage, investments in fixed income instru-
ments or  investments in derivative contracts. 
Figure 5. Measures of Home Bias in Banking Assets across OECD Countries
Note: In each region, the country measure LHBi is weighted by the share of oustanding loans of the country 
in the region. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks (OECD). Countries: Japan 
and Australia; Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom); North America 
(Canada and United States).
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The portfolio characteristics we calculate 
therefore concern only the equity propor-
tion of a fund’s investment. Table 3 gives the 
breakdown of the average market capital-
ization over the sample in billions of dollars 
by country of fund origin. Table 4 gives the 
breakdown of the average number of funds 
also by country of fund origin.
Figure 7 presents the percentage of mutual 
funds based in a given country whose shares 
of domestic holdings in total asset holdings is 
0 percent, strictly larger than 0 percent but 
smaller than 10 percent, between 10 and 20 
percent, . . . , between 90 and 100 percent 
(but strictly below 100 percent) and equal to 
100 percent. The numbers are averages for 
the 1997–2002 period. To simplify, we call 
these different shares of domestic holdings 
in total holdings “different degrees of home 
bias.” For each country, the percentages are 
based on number of funds in a given home 
bias category out of the total number of 
funds for that country and on the share of 
the market capitalization of funds in a given 
category relative to the total market capital-
ization of funds of that country. Thus, funds 
may change from one home bias category to 
another over the course of the sample.
The most striking stylized fact may be 
that there is a great deal of heterogeneity 
both across countries and within country 
in the extent of domestic holdings in total 
holdings. For most countries, the distribu-
tion usually exhibits peaks at 0 percent and 
100 percent (or between 0 and 10 percent 
and between 90 and 100 percent) indicat-
ing substantial specialization of funds into 
either (close to) fully domestic or (close to) 
fully international investment. But, inter-
estingly, there is a nonnegligible part of 
TABLE 3 
Market Capitalization (Average for 1997:1 to 2002:2)—Bn Dollars
 
United States Germany United Kingdom Canada Switzerland France
2,851 225.8 174.6 84.81 74.18 53.43
Sweden Hong Kong Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium
43.84 26.22 26.03 21.52 12.88 12.55
Japan Singapore Luxembourg Ireland South Africa Norway
11.96 9.052 6.35 6.215 3.076 2.559
TABLE 4 
Number of Funds (Average for 1997:1 to 2002:2)
United States Germany United Kingdom Canada Switzerland France
3,165 1,223 495 353 140 212
Sweden Hong Kong Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium
168 66 74 231 66 101
Japan Singapore Luxembourg Ireland South Africa Norway
48 47 54 26 35 34
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the distribution lying in between those two 
extremes, indicating a great deal of hetero-
geneity in diversification choices by the fund 
managers even within country. Thus one 
conjecture is that the observed investment 
pattern at the fund level reflects both some 
increasing returns in the information tech-
nology leading to some concentration in stock 
holdings of either domestic or foreign coun-
tries and a particular market structure induc-
ing product differentiation at the fund level. 
As mentioned in Hau and Rey (2008), there 
is a positive correlation between the number 
of sectors and the number of  countries funds 
invest in, suggesting that more diversified 
funds diversify both across sectors of activity 
and across countries. Larger funds tend also 
to be the most diversified. The role of fund 
mandates in the observed asset holdings is 
of course of great interest. We find that for 
example, in 2002, 701 funds out of our 1,291 
U.S. funds had some kind of explicit man-
dates, which could range from “investing in 
world equities” to “primarily small cap North 
American companies” or “at least 80 percent 
in Latin American companies.” These man-
dates seem to exhibit considerable varia-
tions across countries and are clearly not 
Figure 6. Measures of Home Bias in Banking Assets across Regions
Note: In each region, the country measure LHBi is weighted by the share of oustanding loans of the country 
in the region. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. Bank for International Settlements. Countries: Europe (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden); North America (Canada and United States); Japan; Central and South America (Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico); World (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Canada, United States, Japan, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Panama, Turkey).
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 Figure 7. Home Bias is Measured by Shares of Domestic Holdings in Total Holdings
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exogenous. They too result from the opti-
mizing behavior of financial companies. 
Explaining home bias or indeed investment 
strategies at the fund level thus probably 
requires a theory of fund mandates.
8. Conclusions and Leads for  
Future Research
Our view is that the home bias puzzle 
is now less of a puzzle. From the litera-
ture we labeled “Open Economy Financial 
Macroeconomics” to the rational inattention 
models featuring endogenous information 
acquisition, notable progress has been made 
to understand the determinants of portfo-
lio allocations. We may now be at a stage 
where we should be studying a broad array 
of implications of these new models rather 
than focusing only on the stylized fact of 
equity home bias. Confronting their predic-
tions with a large set of other stylized facts on 
portfolio holdings will surely lead us to refine 
them further and ultimately assess their true 
explanatory power.
The Open Economy Financial Macro-
economics literature has an interesting set of 
predictions on the holdings of a broad menu 
of financial assets. It should be very fruitful 
to introduce in that literature some more 
detailed models of the capital structure of 
firms and to get finer empirical implications 
for equities and corporate/banking debt in 
particular. Applying corporate finance theory 
to model the capital structure of firms seems 
a natural extension of these models, all the 
more so since it has been shown to matter 
empirically to explain the home bias (see 
Dahlquist et al. 2003). One major issue going 
forward will also be the modeling of the offi-
cial sector. Introducing an optimal monetary 
or fiscal policy and modeling their interac-
tions with endogenous portfolio choices of 
the private sector is a major challenge. It is 
likely that as a first step focusing on realistic 
but not necessarily optimal monetary policy 
or fiscal rules will be the way to go. It is an 
important goal to have realistic and work-
able macroeconomic models of the open 
economy with endogenous portfolio choice, 
as large cross border holdings of assets (see 
Gourinchas and Rey 2007a) are likely to 
affect the channels of transmission of mon-
etary and fiscal policy. Understanding the 
short run dynamics of the exchange rate, a 
formidable but crucial task, is also intimately 
linked to agents portfolio choices and gross 
external positions as shown in Gourinchas 
and Rey (2007b) and Della Corte, Sarno, 
and Sestieri (2012). Furthermore, a closer 
look at the maximization problems faced by 
Central Banks when they decide on their 
reserve holdings and by sovereign wealth 
funds would be warranted as both actors now 
account for a nontrivial share of international 
capital flows. The portfolio choice of the offi-
cial sector is also an important determinant 
of the international use of a currency. The 
dollar market share in world transactions 
and the “exorbitant privilege” of the United 
States may be challenged by the new portfo-
lio diversification strategies of emerging mar-
kets in general and China in particular. We 
have few models that can tackle these issues 
in a general equilibrium set up with a rich 
asset structure. The role of international cur-
rencies and their importance in determining 
portfolios and asset price movements is an 
area of active research (see Devereux and 
Shi 2009 or Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot 
2010).
As more detailed survey data on house-
holds become available, one will also be bet-
ter able to test at the microeconomic level 
the empirical relevance of various hedging 
motives underlying the mechanism of these 
Open Economy Financial Macroeconomic 
models. Estimating the correlation of labor 
income risk with various asset returns at a 
disaggregated level—for instance according 
to levels of wealth—would probably enhance 
our understanding of the plausibility of the 
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mechanisms. Importantly, introducing mod-
els with heterogeneous agents in an interna-
tional economics set up seems a priority to 
understand better some of the most stub-
born puzzles of international economics 
such as the Consumption–Real Exchange 
Rate anomaly (Kollmann–Backus–Smith 
puzzle). Limited participation in asset mar-
kets is a promising way to help resolve some 
asset pricing puzzle as shown in particular in 
the context of a closed economy by Guvenen 
(2009). Some steps have been taken by 
Kollmann (2012) and by Coeurdacier, 
Ocaktan, and Rey (2010) in particular to 
introduce limited participation in an open 
economy set up. Furthermore, much like the 
closed economy macroeconomics literature, 
the modeling of financial intermediaries is 
a key missing building block in our current 
DSGE models of the open economy. As the 
literature stands, we have nothing interest-
ing to say about leveraged intermediaries for 
example and their role in the international 
transmission of shocks.
If we want to take a more detailed micro-
economic view of the home bias, we have 
to recognize the large heterogeneity of 
investment strategies both at the household 
level and at the fund manager level. A large 
share of household investment is not direct 
portfolio holdings but intermediated. In 
the United States, according to the Survey 
of Consumer Finance (see Polkovnichenko 
2005), the share of equity held indirectly by 
households through mutual funds, pension 
funds or other investment vehicles has risen 
from about 46 percent in 1989 to close to 
62 percent in 2001. The Federal Reserve 
Bulletin (2009) indicates that between 2004 
and 2007, the fraction of families holding 
publicly traded stocks rose to 51.1 percent. 
Among families that held equity, either 
directly or indirectly, in 2007, ownership 
through a tax-deferred retirement account 
was most common (84 percent of fami-
lies), followed by direct holdings of stocks 
(35 percent of families), direct holdings 
of pooled investment funds (21 percent of 
families), and managed investment accounts 
(8 percent of families). If we take a different 
angle and look at the total amount of equity, 
37.8 percent was held in tax-deferred retire-
ment accounts, 33.6 percent as directly held 
stocks, 22.1 percent as directly held pooled 
investment funds, and 6.5 percent as other 
managed assets. Strikingly if we look at the 
families holding stocks directly 36 percent 
of them hold only one stock and 48 percent 
hold between two and nine stocks. The typi-
cal portfolio of households who participate 
in the financial market is therefore very 
dichotomic: it contains a very small num-
ber of stocks, which are directly held and 
a more diversified stock portfolio, which is 
usually managed by a third party. It is still 
a major challenge for the existing literature 
to reproduce such a dual investment strat-
egy at the household level. It is even more 
of a challenge to reproduce it together with 
the great heterogeneity in investment strate-
gies at the fund level that we documented in 
graph 1. The endogenous information acqui-
sition literature (see Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp 2010) seems promising since in 
the presence of increasing returns to infor-
mation acquisition, it is possible to generate 
concentrated portfolios, a prediction that 
accords well with the directly held portion 
of household equities. It should however 
probably be enriched with a model making 
explicit delegated portfolio management 
strategies. A first step in this direction has 
been taken by Dziuda and Mondria (2012). 
In their paper, asymmetrically informed 
households delegate their investment deci-
sions to fund managers of stochastic abili-
ties. Since domestic households know more 
about home country assets, they are better 
able to evaluate the performance of manag-
ers investing in home assets. Hence more 
highly skilled managers, who benefit from 
transparency, are more likely to operate in 
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domestic markets. Therefore a small infor-
mation asymmetry at the household level 
is able to generate home bias due to the 
endogenous decision of skilled fund man-
agers to operate in the domestic market. 
This framework however cannot generate 
the heterogeneous distribution of invest-
ment strategies observed at the fund level. 
It also does not have anything to say regard-
ing the determinants of funds mandates 
and benchmarks. It would be interesting 
to explain the determinants of the distribu-
tion of funds mandates across countries for 
example, as it seems to exhibit considerable 
heterogeneity. It is likely that the literature 
on endogenous information acquisition and 
delegated investment still misses an impor-
tant component of the incentives of fund 
managers, which could be marketing and 
product differentiation. More data on the 
number and type of distinct funds owned 
by each household would be necessary to 
fully understand the trade-offs. As pointed 
out in Veldkamp (2011, 101), investors 
may want to concentrate their portfolios 
with one fund manager if efficient pricing 
of investment services lead to quantity dis-
count as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1990). 
There is little doubt however that under-
standing better delegated investment strat-
egies and the constraints and incentives of 
fund managers would be an important step 
to study the extent and time series variation 
of international risk sharing, the interna-
tional transmission of financial shocks and 
the propagation of crises. Recent work by 
Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) is a first step 
in that direction: they show how regulatory 
constraints and investment mandates can 
generate financial contagion through cross-
border portfolio decisions. More generally, 
a promising avenue of research would be to 
study optimal regulatory or taxation policies 
in environment featuring endogenous asym-
metric information or principal–agent prob-
lems due to delegated investment.
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